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FRANK WOOLDRIDGE*
VISHNU D. SHARMAt

International Law and the
Expulsion of Ugandan Asians
The Ugandan Asian Community
The Ugandan Asian Community which came mainly from the Punjab,
Gujurat and Goa, formed an unpopular minority whose numbers increased
substantially during the present century.1 Their unpopularity stemmed in part
from the degree of economic success that they had enjoyed. Before the expulsion
of the non-citizen Asians, the Ugandan Asian community played a very
important role in commerce and industry.2 They had come to the country as
railway workers, but many of them had entered commerce.
During the period of the British protectorate, they had been favored by the
British administrators in the granting of trade licenses, whilst banks were often
prepared to grant them credit on favourable terms. By the time of
independence, they had built up important interconnections in the internal
wholesale and retail trade, and also in the export-import trade.3 Considerable
differences often occurred between the incomes of Asians and Africans, 4 and
members of the Ismailia community were often very wealthy.
The Asians were also unpopular because they maintained religious and
cultural distinctions and did not generally mix socially, or intermarry with
Africans.S They were often accused of economic exploitation of Africans, and of
corrupt business practices. 6 Such accusation often stemmed from the employ*LL.M., Ph.D., Lecturer in Law, University of Birmingham, England.
tB.A., LL.M., Ph.D. (London); Principal Lecturer in Law, School of Business Studies, City
of London Polytechnic; Member, British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
'See Y. GHAI and D. GHAI, THE ASIAN MINORITIES OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, pub.
Minority Rights Group (which is currently being revised) and JUSTIN O'BRIEN, BROWN BRITONS,
pub. Runnymede Trust 1972, for accounts of the East African and the Ugandan Asians. See also
PORTRAIT OF A MINORITY, pub. O.U.P. 1963, especially the contributions by Dharam P. Ghai.
2
See the figures quoted by Justin O'Brien, GeneralAmin and the Ugandan Asians, ROUND
TABLE, page 91 at page 98.
'Justin O'Brien, op. cit., supra, note 1, at page 92.
'Justin O'Brien, op. cit., supra, note 1, at page 98.
'Note, in this context, the memorandum of the Asian leaders to President Amin of Dec. 8th
1971, which may be found in the work cited by Justin O'Brien. The unwillingness of Africans of
different tribes to intermarry is pointed out in this memorandum.
6
For the view of an East African Ismailia Muslim, as to the truth of some of the charges levelled
at the Ugandan Asians, see the letter of A. K. Rupani, LL.M., to The Times of SeptemberSth, 1972
at page 13.
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ment of traditional Asian proceedures of bargaining.7 They were also frequently
accused of sending money out of the country.
Owing to the system of trade licensing which dated from the days of the
protectorate,8 the Asians tended to be confined to the large towns, such as
Entebbe, Kampala and Jinja. They did not engage in agriculture, and were, in
fact, precluded from owning land.9 They thus limited themselves to trade,
industry, the professions and skilled employment. Although there were some
notable exceptions, they generally failed before the attainment of independence
to identify sufficiently with African aspirations towards freedom.10 One cannot
regard the mass expulsions of the Ugandan Asians as historically inevitable, but
the ending of their privileged status must be so regarded.
As they lacked political power, themselves, and could no longer depend on the
political power of the British, their main hope of survival was to prove
themselves useful to the dominant political and economic power groups in
Uganda. It was evident that, in time, the local bourgeoisie would find their
competition troublesome, and that a decreasing degree of dependence would be
felt on them. Thus trade licensing and other legislation aimed at discriminating
in favour of local citizens was probably inevitable. It would also have been
possible for Uganda to nationalise the smaller and medium sized Asian
businesses: the larger ones were nationalised by Dr. Obote in 1970.
The Ugandan Asians valued education, and made a considerable
contribution to the professions. It is not surprising that General Amin offered
members of certain professions (and certain other persons) exemption from
expulsion, in accordance with his two relevant decrees ordering the expulsion of
1
non-citizen Asians. '
In the present article, consideration will be given to the circumstances leading
to the expulsion; the carrying out of the expulsions and the expropriation of the
Asian property, and the reaction of this country and the international
community to these actions. The international legality of the expulsions and the
expropriation of the Asian property will then be considered, and an attempt will
be made to draw some general conclusions from the international reaction to the
actions of General Amin.
The Impact of the Ugandan Nationality Laws
on the Asians
It is necessary to consider Ugandan nationality laws before adverting to the
circumstances which led to the expulsion of the Asians. Before Uganda became
7

D.P. Ghai, op. cit., supra, note 1, at page 104.
'Seefor example, the Trade Act of 1938.
'D.P. Ghai, op. cit. at page 100-101.
0
"See Yash Tandon's contribution to the work cited above at page 69.
"Decree Nos. 17 and 30 of 1972.
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independent, the Asians residing in that country, which was a British protectorate, sometimes had citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies as a result
of descent from persons born in undivided Imperial India, 2 or as a result of
registration13 or naturalisation."4 Certain of them were Indian 5 or Pakistani
nationals, whilst a category remained of British protected persons.
The parents of such persons were often born in Portuguese Africa or it the
Indian princely states, so that they did not enjoy British citizenship through
descent, but could acquire it through naturalisation or registration. The
independence of Uganda in October 196216 did not mean that Uganda Asians
automatically acquired Ugandan nationality. Section 7(1) of the Ugandan
Constitution of 1962,17 provided that all persons born in Uganda who were
citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies, or British protected persons,
should become citizens of Uganda on October 9th, 1962.
It continued, however, to provide that a person should not become a citizen of
Uganda in virtue of this subsection if neither of his parents were born in
Uganda.' 8 It was provided by sections 8(1)-8(5) of the Constitution, that those
subject to the proviso mentioned, and the wives or ex-wives of such persons,
should be registered as citizens of Uganda upon making application before
October 9th, 1964, in the prescribed form.19
The Uganda Citizenship Ordinance of October 9th, 1962, section 6(2)0
provides that persons who apply for citizenship by registration shall become
citizens by registration on the date on which they are registered. Section 6(2)
provides as follows:
If a person of full age, who is registered as a citizen of Uganda under this Ordinance
does not produce to such office as the Minister may appoint in that behalf, within
"British Nationality Act, 1948, sections 5, 12 (2) and 12 (3).
"Ibid., section 6 (1) (b), section 6 (2) and section 7.
'Ibid., section 10 and Schedule 2, para 3, and also Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962,
section 12 (2).
"See the provisions of the Indian Constitution, articles 5-11, and the Indian Citizenship Act,
1955.
"See the Uganda Independence Order, 1962, S.I. 962/2125.
'The Constitution was revised in 1967, but suspended at least in part, on the accession of
General Amin to power. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 13-20th, 1971, at page
24451. On February 2nd, 1971, General Amin announced (Decree No. 5 of 1971, published March
12th) that he had taken the necessary steps to confirm himself in power, and that certain
constitutional provisions had been suspended. As a result, all power previously held by the president
would be vested in himself as military Head of State. Parliament was dissolved. He stated that all
legislative powers vested in him, and he would legislate by decrees signed by himself, being assisted
by a cabinet with advisory functions. For obvious reasons, the legality of the Ugandan revolution of
1971 does not appear to have been tested in the courts.
" This rejection of the jus soli occurs in other African countries. Note the provisions of the
Kenyan Constitution of 1969, chapter 6, which relate to citizenship.
"Note also article 4 and aricle 6 (3) (a) of the new Constitution of 1967. Article 4 provides that
those who have been registered or who become registered in accordance with the law are Ugandan
citizens.
2°Uganda Statutory Instruments, No. 63 of 1962.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. )

Expulsion of UgandanAsians

33

three months of being so registered, or within such further period as the Minister or
such officer may allow, evidence sufficient to satisfy such officer that he has
renounced any other nationality or citizenship which he may have possessed and that
he has taken an oath of allegiance in the form specified in the First Schedule to this
Ordinance, the registration of that person as a citizen of Uganda shall be cancelled,
and he shall be deemed never to have been registered."

It was realized by the U.K. that many Asians would be reluctant to acquire
Ugandan nationality, and that if the transfer of sovereignty led to the termination of their British citizenship or nationality, they would be rendered stateless.
The U.K. signed the U.N. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness22 in
1961, but did not ratify it until some years later. She felt bound by her signature
to this convention to make some provision for the retention of British nationality
by those Ugandan Asians who did not become registered as Ugandan nationals.
To this end, S.2(2) of the Ugandan Independence Act, 1962, provided for the
retention of citizenship, by those Ugandans who were citizens of the U.K. and
colonies before the appointed day (October 9th, 1962), until such time as they
acquired Ugandan citizenship in accordance with the laws of Uganda. Section
2(1) of the Act made a similar provision for the retention of British protected
status.I3
Many Asians shared little confidence in the Ugandan government, and they
thus did not opt for Ugandan citizenship; or if they did, they ensured that
certain members of their families did not, but opted tor British, Indian or
Pakistani citizenship or nationality. At one time it was discovered that none of
the Asian members of Parliament were Ugandan citizens.2" The Ugandan
authorities felt concerned by this apparent lack of confidence, and also at the

"See also the new Constitution of 1967, article 6(3)(a), which is in similar terms. The term "other
nationality" would appear to be applicable to those who were British protected persons, who are

British nationals in international law. See
PROTECTION,

CUTHBERT JOSEPH, NATIONALITY

AND DIPLOMATIC

pub. 1969 at page 126.

"For the text of the convention, see the I.C.L.Q., 1962, page 1090. Article 8(1) provides that:
A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality, if such deprivation would render
him stateless. Grounds for deprivation are, however, included in Articles 8(2) and 8(3) of the
Convention. Of special interest, in the present context, is Article 8(3)(b) providing that such
deprivation takes place on the ground:
That the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration of allegiance, to another state,
or has given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the
Contracting State.
The above convention has received insufficient ratifications for entry into force.
"See also British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order, 1965, S.I. No.
1864, article 10. It is also possible to renounced this status: ibid., Article 19; but if the renunciation
does not result in the acquisition of another nationality within six months, the previous nationality is
re-assumed.
British protected persons are British nationals according to international law: see also MERVYN
JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAw, pub. 1956, at page 194. We have been informed by Praful Patel,
of the Ugandan Asian Resettlement Board, that such persons were granted entry to the United
Kingdom on being expelled from Uganda.
"See JUDITH LISTOWEL, AMIN, pub. Irish Universities Press, 1972, p. 112.
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large amount of economic power exercised by the Asians. 25
It became clear during the presidency of Dr. Milton Obote, that certain
Ugandan Asians who thought that they had acquired Ugandan nationality had
not, in fact, done so; and that the large majority of them might become stateless
on application for a new Ugandan passport being rejected.1 6This came about as
a result of the fact that they had not submitted evidence of renunciation of
citizenship or nationality within the ninety-day period allowed by section 6(2) of
the Uganda Citizenship Ordinance.27
If registration of the renunciation of their British citizenship did not take
effect until after May 18th, 1964, section 2 of the British Nationality Act (No. 1)
of 1964 came into operation to prevent them from becoming stateless, but if it
took place at an earlier date, such persons would become stateless on refusal to
28
renew their Ugandan passports.
The delay in submitting relevant evidence can be explained in some cases by
the collusive attitude of the Ugandan authorities to such delays, and in others by
the dilatory action of the new Ugandan citizens, or of the Ugandan authorities.
It appears that, in some cases, persons who were registered as Ugandan citizens
managed to retain their British passports, the Ugandan authorities conniving at
the absence of renunciation of nationality or citizenship.
The Early Actions of General Amin
When General Amin came to power in 1971, it was thought that he would
endorse the agreement which had nearly been reached with President Obote,
increasing the number of vouchers to be issued to Ugandan Asians, and thus
"Measures were taken to reduce these: see the Immigration Act, Act No. 19, of 1969; the
Immigration Regulations issued in pursuance of section 18 of the act; and the Trade Licensing Act
of the same year, 1969. Note that economic discrimination against non-nationals is permitted by
article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966: the
legislation in question applied to non-citizen Asians.
11Y. GHAI AND D. GHAI, op. cit. supra, note 1, at page 17.
"Some of the applications for citizenship were not processed, if at all, for several years after the
attainment of independence. In a case known to the writers, a Ugandan Asian was granted
citizenship of Uganda in April 1965, but did not submit evidence of renunciation to the Ugandan
authorities until March 1966, and consequently his Ugandan passport was confiscated. In this case,
his British citizenship was deemed to have remained in existence in virtue of section 2 of the British
Nationality Act (No. 1), 1964, and he was admitted to that country.
2
Section 2(1) of the British Nationality Act, 1964, which came into effect on May 18th, 1964,
provides as follows:
A declaration of renunciation of citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies may be made
under section 19 of the principal act by a person who is not a national or citizen of any other
country, and shall, if so made, be registered under that section if, but only if, the Secretary of
State is satisfied that that person will, after the registration, become a citizen of some other
country: and if that person does not become such a citizen within six months from the date of
registration, he shall be deemed to have remained a citizen of the U.K. and Colonies....
Note the British Nationality Regulations, S.I. 1965, No. 1753: reg. 19, paras. 17 and 23, which
empower the making of a declaration of renunciation to the British High Commissioner in countries
within section 1(3) of the British Nationality Act, 1948.
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permitted an increased outflow of emigrants to this country. 29 General Amin
refused to endorse the draft agreement, and it continued to be felt by many that,
despite the trade licensing and immigration legislation, the Asians still held a
dominant economic position in Uganda. It was frequently alleged that Asians of
non-Ugandan nationality, fearing that they would soon have to leave,

accumulated deposits in foreign banks as a result of failing to declare the full
revenues obtained from exports, and by means of other devices.
General Amin was swift to realise that Draconian measures taken by him
against Asians would win him popularity. In early October 1971, all Asians in

Uganda were required to report to census offices on October 12th in order to
produce nationality documents, and as a result of the scrutiny of these

documents, many Ugandan Asians had their passports confiscated,

0

and many

of them were consequently rendered stateless for the reasons already
explained."'
Although it appears to be generally agreed by international lawyers that states
may not expel their own nationals, 32 the position with regard to aliens and
stateless persons is different, and will be explored at a later stage in this paper.
2
As is well known, such immigration was restricted by the "patrial" section of the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968, amending section 1 of the 1962 Act. These acts have been
repealed by the Immigration Act, 1971, which came into force on January 1st, 1973. Section 2(6) of
this Act defines patrials as those having the right of abode in the United Kingdom. Sections
2(1)(a)-(d) and section 2(2) enumerate the classes of persons having a right of abode. Their practical
effect is to discriminate in favour of those who are predominantly white British subjects, and who
have emigrated, or whose families have emigrated, from the United Kingdom. It will be
remembered that the Teheran Conference of the International Commission of Jurists treated the
concept of partiality as discriminatory. Nigel Fisher, speaking in the House of Commons in 1968,
stated that the patrial clause violated human rights and created second-class citizens: see
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Volume 767, columns 1663-6. See also the view of the
European Commission of Human Rights expressed its decision as to the admissibility of the
complaints in the Patel case, as to the discriminatory nature of the patrial clause, I.L.M., 1971, at
pp. 9 and 40.
3
See Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, January lst-8th, 1972, at Column 25023. It is not certain
that Uganda has broken any international obligations by taking this action. The Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, article 8 of which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of nationality, is
not yet in force, and Uganda is not a party to it. In any event, the Ugandan action can be construed
as merely declaratory of an existing state of affairs. Despite the provisions of article 15(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declaration has been very frequently referred to in
later G.A. resolutions, it is uncertain whether there is a rule of international customary law,
forbidding the deprivation of nationals of their nationality: see P. WEISS, NATIONALITY AND
STATELESSNESS, pages 126-30. It may, however, be argued that the indiscriminate depriving of
nationality, is an abuse of rights which engages international responsibility: see LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, page 310. If it could be shown that the
deprivation of nationality, if it can be so considered, was with the object of expelling the Asians, it
would seem a fortiori to be an abuse of rights, but there seems to have been no such object in the
mind of General Amin, at the time of the deprivation of the Asians of their nationality.
"As already pointed out, some of the renunciations of nationality did not have such an effect. See
the statement of Mr. Carr the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, to the House of Commons to this
effect: Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 910, 17th-l9th October 1972, column 262. See also Issue No. 913,
Column 203.
"See PAUL WEISS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS, pub. Stevens at page 57; note also the
U.N. Study on Expulsion of Immigrants, U.N. Doc. St/SOA 22, at paragraph 35.
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It may at present be noted that some have argued that a denaturalising state
must admit its former nationals, but this contention is debatable.
In December 1971, General Amin addressed a ineeting of representatives of
Asians from all parts of the country in Kampala.33 He accused certain of the
Asians of lack of loyalty to Uganda, refusal to integrate, and of the commission
of a number of offenses. These included abuse of Ugandan exchange control
regulations; the smuggling of commodities such as sugar abroad; the hoarding
of goods in order to create an artificial shortage; renting premises to Africans at
inflated prices; unfair competition; the evasion of income tax and the
corruption of officials. President Amin also announced his intention to cancel
pending applications for citizenship. He stated that the applicants might renew
their applications, but that such renewed applications would not be treated
favorably unless the Asian community attempted to integrate themselves.
The Asian leaders replied to General Amin's statement in a reasoned
memorandum addressed to the president, which memorandum contained a
powerful defence of the position of the Asians.1 4 It emphasized, inter alia, the
minority position of the Asians; their inability to effect major social changes; the
facts that Africans were also sometimes guilty of criminal offences, and were
also prejudiced against intermarriage; and also challenged the legality of the
president's decision regarding the applications for citizenship.
It would appear that the Asians were justified in doubting the constitutionality of this action, and it appears that the Ugandan authorities had no
discretion to refuse to register those Ugandan Asians as citizens who complied
with the requirements of sections 8(1) and 8(5) of the Ugandan Constitution of
1962, and of section 6(2) of the Uganda Citizenship Ordinance, 1962. Despite
the 1966 revolution, these legal provisions remained in force at least until
General Amin's assumption of power. The Asians' request, that the matter be
referred to the Ugandan judges, appears justified. About 12,000 Asians were
affected by the president's decision which has just been mentioned.
The Expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, and the
Expropriation of Their Property
For several months, no further action was taken with regard to the Asian
community.'- On August 4th, 1972, President Amin announced that he would
ask Britain to take over responsibility for the Ugandan Asians holding British

"See Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, supra, Jan. 18th, 1972, at page 25023, and also Justin
O'Brien, op. cit., supra, note 1, at pages 25-32, for the full text of the president's statement.
"For this memorandum, see the work cited by Justin O'Brien at page 32.
"However, in February 1972, General Amin visited Colonel Gadhafi of Libya, who was himself
responsible for the expropriation of Italian property.
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passports, as they were sabotaging the economy.3 6 On August 9th, the president
announced that he had signed a decree revoking, from that date, most entry
permits and certificates of residence of non-citizen Asians. Holders of cancelled
entry permits and certificates were given 90 days to leave Uganda; certain
categories of persons were exempted from the decree.37
According to section 9(1) of the Immigration Act, 1969 (no. 19), no person
may remain in Uganda unless he is in possession of an entry certificate which is
valid, a certificate of residence or a pass. This section is applicable to all noncitizen Asians who have not been exempted by the minister.
Despite talks between Geoffrey Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, and President Amin, the latter refused to alter his decision, although
he changed his mind about a later decision to expel Asians of Ugandan
nationality.3 8 Expellees were sometimes treated with considerable brutality.3 9
On October 19th, 1972, President Amin announced that, "because of continued
sabotage by the Asians," all Asians with Kenyan, Tanzanian and Zambian
citizenship would have to leave Uganda by November 8th. In early October,
1972, a further check on the documents of-Ugandan Asians took place."0 The
threat of being placed in internment camps was responsible for a rapid exodus
of the Asians.
President Amin wrote to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General of the
United Nations who had been exercising his good offices on behalf of the
Asians, stating that he had no intention of confiscating the property of the
3
For his early statements on the expulsions, see the Uganda Argus, August 5th and 21st, 1972,
each at page 1, cols. 3-4; see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Sept. 16th-23rd, 1972, at page
25469, and JUDITH LISTOWEL, AMIN, at page 143. The Asians were often accused of making
improper payments abroad, and their accounts have been blocked: see Decree No. 18 of 1972,
section 5. If they are unable to take their money out of the country, this may possibly itself amount
to an expropriation. See WORT.EY, EMROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, pub. 1959 at
pages 108-9, and Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?
B.Y.I.L. 1962, at pages 331-3.
'For the classes of person exempted, see S.I. No. 124 of 1972, Uganda Gazette Supplement,
August l1th, 1972. For the decree, see Supplement to the Uganda Gazette of August 11th, 1972. It
applied to Ugandan Asians of British, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladesh citizenship. Reference
should also be made to Decree No. 30, of October 25th, 1972. Despite the apparent power to exempt
classes of persons, almost all the non-citizens have left of their own volition. The reason for the
amendment of the decree was that stateless Asians were not subject to expulsion, according to
Decree No. 17. Decree No. 30 thus provided for the expulsion of any other persons of Indian,
Pakistani or Bangladesh origin, extraction or descent. It is clear that the form of words employed in
this decree might give rise to difficulties in interpretation. The decree also provided for the expulsion
of subjects of Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya who were of Asian origin, extraction or descent.
"The representations made to him by President Nyerere, as well as those of the Ugandan
National Union of Students, may have influenced him in making this decision. For the comments of
President Nyerere on General Amin's decision, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972,
September 16-23rd, at page 25470. President Kaunda of Zambia called the expulsion of Asians of
non-Ugandan nationality "terrible, abominable, horrible, and shameful." See the article by R.
West, What Afica thinks of Amin, New Statesman and Nation, Sept. 11th, 1972, p. 345.
"See the report in The Times of October 10th, 1972, at page 8. See also JUDITH LISTOWEL, op.
cit., supra, note 2, at page 155.
"See Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, Dec. 2nd-9th, 1972, page 25599.
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Asians without the payment of compensation. He stated that the Asians had
been asked to specify agents who would look after the property until its sale."'
Two decrees were made concerning the declaration and sale of the assets of the
non-citizen Asians, 42 which decrees were made retrospective to August 9th,
1972. 4 The first decree provided that departing Asians might not transfer
immovable property, bus companies, farms including livestock or businesses to
44
any other person.
They were also not allowed to mortgage such property, 45 and in the case of
companies they were not allowed to issue new shares, change the salaries or
terms of employment of staff, appoint new directors or alter their conditions of
service. 4 6 Departing Asians were required to make a declaration of their assets,
which declaration would be registered with the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce. 4 7 Failure to make the necessary declaration resulted in vesting of the
property in the government."" Attempted private sales were made punishable by
fine or imprisonment. 49 The second decree, which amended the first, granted
agents appointed according to the first decree power of sale, leasing, acquisition
and transfer of Asian property, with the consent of the Abandoned Property
50
Custodian Board.
The agents were not permitted to deal with the property in any way which
frustrated the declared policy of the government. 5' This board consisted of six
"See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Dec. 2nd-9th, 1972, page 25599. Accountants and
lawyers sometimes undertook the task of acting as agents.
"See Decree No. 27, Uganda Gazette supplement of 1972, 13th October, 1972, as amended by
Decree No. 29, Uganda Gazette supplement of 1972, 27th October, 1972. The Ugandan Asians were
required to declare their assets on two forms, PRO/i and PRO/2, enclosing copies of accounts for
the last two years, and lists of contracts.
"See Decree No. 17, Article 9. Some of the Asians had left the country before they had the
opportunity to appoint agents. Some non-citizen Asians managed to sell property or otherwise
dispose of it to citizen Asians, Africans and non-citizens who, it was thought, might be exempted
from expulsion before they departed from Uganda. It is thought that General Amin retrospectively
invalidated transactions which occurred before October 4, partly because he considered that
dispositions of property had taken place over which the Ugandan authorities had no control, in
respect of which he may have entertained doubts regarding their economic benefits to Uganda.
"Decree No. 27, aricle 1(a).
"Ibid., article 1(b).
4Ibid., section 1(c).
"Ibid., sections 2 and 3. The owners were required to appoint agents for the purpose of
negotiating with the government: Ibid.. section 2(2)(d). See also section 4 of the decree for the
disposal of applications for purchase.
"Ibid., section 4(5).
"Ibid., section 5.
5
Decree No. 29 section 1. Abandoned property includes any business enterprise, real property,
vehicle and any other chattel which in the opinion of the Board, may be sold at a reasonable price:
ibid., section 16(5)(c).
5
Ibid., section 1(6). Agents must carry out the directions of the board, ibid., section 1(5). It
transpired in practice that many agents were unable to get control of the property in respect of
which they were appointed, The contemplated sales of such property may be regarded as forced
sales from the viewpoint of public international law, and hence, when they occur, as expropriations:
see WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, B.Y.I.L. 1962, page 307 at page
324 et seq.
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ministers.5 2 Property was vested in it which had vested in the government in
virtue of section 4(5) of the previous decree. The board was also empowered by
statutory order to declare property to be vested in it which was abandoned by a
departing Asian, or left in such a way that no adequate arrangement had been
made for its proper and efficient management. 3 The decree made provision for
the payment of compensation in respect of such property. 4 It is possible to
appeal from the decision of the valuers who assess the compensation to a
tribunal, and thence to the High Court.55 No time limit is stated within which
compensation must be paid. Ugandan exchange control regulations prohibited
payments from being made outside the "scheduled territory" without the
consent of the minister. 6
The Ugandan Asians thus had to leave without their property, and,
consequently, social security payments have been made to many of them in the
U.K. A large number arrived there destitute.
Ugandan Asian property which was abandoned has been occupied by
Africans 7 and foreign banks have received no satisfaction in respect of
mortgages, debentures or liens thereon.58 The occupation of the property in
question has been by virtue of General Amin's decree of Feb. 9th, 1973. s' The
properties vested in the government have generally been let to Africans at a
rent. 60 The minister responsible for fixing the rent is the Minister of Mineral
and Water Resources. The valuation of the minister is final.6 '
The rentals accruing from such properties are to be paid into a fund, and
compensation is payable from this fund to the former owners of the dwelling
houses and business premises in question. 6' The decree defines departed Asians
5

Decree No. 29, section 8. For a list of properties which vested in the board, according to section
12(2)3 of Decree No. 29, see S.I. No. 169 and S.I. No. 174 of 1972.
lbid., section 12(2). The board is given the same power of sale or other disposition over the
property of the departing Asian.
'Ibid., section 16(1).
"Ibid., sections 16(2) to 16(5).
"Decree No. 18, Uganda Gazette Supplement, August llth, 1972, section 5. The Scheduled
Territory, according to S.I. No. 111 of 1965, was composed of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, but is
now apparently treated as being limited to Uganda itself, according apparently to a circular issued
by the State Bank of Uganda in early 1972. The writers have been so informed by a senior official of
National and Grindlay's Bank. Departing Asians were apparently only allowed to take L50 with
them, and their accounts have recently been transferred to the Commercial Bank of Uganda.
'?See the report in the East Africa Standard, pub. Nairobi, Jan. llth, 1973 at page 1. Also see
Voice of Uganda pub. Kampala, April 5th, 1973, page 3.
"Note decree no. 29 of 1972, section 15, which forbids a creditor of a departing Asian from
exercising any right without the permission of the Abandoned Property Compensation Board, and
see also the decree of Feb. 9th, 1973, section 8, which enables the minister to disclaim or vary
obligations with which property vested in the government is burdened.
"Decree No. 5, 1973. The decree was made retrospective to November 8th, 1972: Many of the
properties had already been allocated in the period between November and February 1973.
"Ibid., section 3(3). The writers have been informed by Praful Patel, a member of the Uganda
Resettlement Board, that favouritism has been shown to Muslim members of the armed forces.
"Ibid., section 9.
"Ibid., sections 6 and 7(a).
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as non-citizen Asians and Uganda citizen Asians whose property is
abandoned. 63 The latter category seems to include those Asians who departed in
response to General Amin's original intention to expel all Asians. The Decree of
Feb. 19th, 1973 is stated to prevail over the provisions of Decree No. 27 of 1972,
as amended by Decree No. 29, as far as its provisions are inconsistent with
them. 6
Foreign banks which some departing Asians appointed as agents have not
been allowed to exercise their functions. 6 It seems that both abandoned
property and certain properties in respect of which agents were appointed have
been vested in the government. 66 The properties have been allocated to private
individuals, four cabinet committees being concerned with this work. At first,
the allocation tended to be to Baganda business men, but by March 1972, they
were generally to Muslim soldiers. The Abandoned Property Custodian Board
67
has not exercised any function with regard to the property.
The bank accounts of the expelled Asians which had been blocked, have
recently been transferred to the Commercial Bank of Uganda.68 The British
High Commissioner in Kampala asked the Ugandan government whether the
properties which Africans were occupying had been sold, leased or let at a rent,
and received no reply. 69 No money has yet been paid into the Asian accounts by
63

Ibid., section 11.
decree was passed by President Amin in August 1973 making provision for the management
of the estates of missing persons. It does not appear to have any application to the properties of the
departed Asians. Section 5(b) of Decree No. 20 of 1973 states that any person (which must include
the state) likely to be adversely affected by the grant of an order under the decree may lodge a
memorandum of objection stating that the person named in the notice as missing authorised in
writing some other person to manage his estate. Thus the properties in respect of which the agents
were appointed cannot be within the purview of the decree. Nor can properties in respect of which
agents were not appointed as those vested in the Ugandan government in virtue of section 12(1) of
Decree No. 29 of 1972. It is understood that the decree in question was passed in order to provide for
the management of property belonging to political opponents of President Amin, who had left the
country or who had disappeared.
"Apparently one agent who attempted to take possession of the property in respect of which he
was appointed, which he is entitled to do according to section 2(4) of decree No. 27 of 1972, was
imprisoned for a short time for theft.
"'The writers have been so informed by an official of the Property Records section of the Foreign
Office.
"The writers thank Dr. Yash Tandon of the L.S.E. for this information.
"See the statement of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in the
House of Commons on December 19th, 1972. Parl. Debates, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 912,
December 15-22nd, columns 1126-1127.
"The writers are grateful to Praful Patel of the Uganda Resettlement Board for the information
in question. They have been informed by a spokesman for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
that the British High Commissioner has made repeated representations to the Ugandan authorities
since August 1972, sometimes questioning the legality of the decrees, and sometimes questioning the
apparent failure of the Ugandan authorities to follow the procedure laid down by them. Thus the
Foreign Office are at present making representations on behalf of a Ugandan Asian who had left the
country before the decrees came into effect, such that he was not a "deporting" Asian according to
Decrees No. 27 or 29, yet his property was confiscated. The Uganda government has agreed to
negotiations concerning compensation for the departed Asians, but has not yet agreed upon a time
when they might begin.
64A
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way of compensation and no compensation determined by the Abandoned
Property Compensation Board. It seems that no legal representatives acted for
the persons whose property was taken.
During the period from 30th Aug. 1972 to 31st March 1973, 27,036 persons
arrived in the U.K. from Uganda as a result of President Amin's decree. 0 It
appears that practically all the Asians were evacuated by the Nov. 8th
deadline. 7
The British Governmental Reaction to the
Expulsion of the Ugandan Asians
It was admitted by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons when the
debate took place on the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, that if East
African Asians were thrown out of work and ejected, we should be under an
obligation to admit them.72 The obligation in question might be considered
either as a correlative of the limited right of expulsion vested in a state according
to international law, and owed both to the expelling state and to the
international community,73 or it may be considered as an obligation owed by the
receiving state to its nationals.74 The latter view has come into prominence in
recent years, and may receive some support from the statements of the delegates
of Kenya, Uganda and Pakistan at the London Conference of Commonwealth
leaders of 1969. "
Mr. Rippon's statement of August 13th, 1972 appears to support the traditional view. In his words:

7

Cmnd. 5296, para 1.

"Ibid., para 10.
"Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons, 5th Session), Volume 759, column 1501.
"This traditional view is upheld by PANHuys, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw, pub. 1959, at pages 55-6. See also FRANcois, HANDBOEK VAN HET VOLKENRECHT, 2nd ed.,
Vol. 1, 1949, at page 483; LESSING, DAs REcH'r DER STAATSANGEH6RIGKEIT UND DIE
ANERKENNUNG DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT ZU STRAF UND SICHERUNGSZWECKE, 1937, at page
117, and Duynstee, Vreemdelingenrecht, 1956, at page 55. The report was submitted to the
Netherlands International Law Review, Mededelingen, No. 36 (March 1956) page 53.
"Note the interesting discussion in Plender, INTERNATIONAL IMMiGRATIoN LAW, pub. Sythoff,
Leyden, 1972, at pages 71 et seq. The right to enter one's own country is protected by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, article 13(2), the precise legal effect of which is difficult to determine;
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 12(4), which covenant is not yet in force, and by
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article S(d)(1 1). Britain is
a signatory of this convention, but Uganda is not. The British reservation to the convention as of
1971, stated that the U.K. does not regard the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968 as
involving racial discrimination within the meaning of article 1(1) of any other provision of the
convention, and reserves the right to continue to apply these acts. It appears that any state party to
the convention might argue that this reservation is incompatible with the objects and purposes of the
convention, and invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court, which would decide the
compatibility in accordance with article 22 of the convention.
"See The Times of January 7th, 8th and 9th of that year, and also the article by Plender: The
Exodus of Asians from East and CentralAfrica, A.J.C.L. 1971, page 281 at p. 320.
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If people are expelled, and they are U.K. passport holders, 6 then however
the conditions in which it was
unreasonable the expulsion may be, and however unjust
brought about, we have to accept the responsibility.77
It is noteworthy that the British authorities at no stage tried to argue that the
Asians had no genuine link with Britain. It would have been difficult for this
country to do so for many reasons. The Principle in the Nottehohm case" is
probably applicable only to the possibility of nationality to a state with which
the claimant has substantial connection, when an international claim is made by
the national state of the claimant. If the principle of the Nottehohm case is
applicable in the field in question, it is suggested that the British Asians had
sufficient links with the United Kingdom by birth in a British protectorate, and
descent from persons born in Imperial India to enable them to enjoy a right of
entry.
Had Britain not admitted these Ugandan Asians who were her citizens or
nationals, and who had nowhere else to go, she would probably have been acting
in breach of her obligations fixed by the European Convention of Human
Rights. Although Britain is not a signatory to the Fourth Protocol to this
Convention, Article 3(4) of which provides that no person shall be deprived of
the right to enter the state of which he is a national, refusal to admit nationals
who have nowhere else to go might be regarded as contrary to certain of the
provisions of the convention.
In the Patel case, the European Commission of Human Rights declared
certain of the complaints of 25 East African Asians admissible, insofar as they
declared possible violations of articles 3, 5, 8, 12 and 14 of the convention. The
refusal to admit nationals who had nowhere else to go, or to grant them
permanent entry, was thus held to be a possibly degrading treatment within the
ambit of article 3 of the convention, which treatment might also be so
constituted as discrimination on the ground of race." 9 The decision of the
European Commission in the Patelcase may have helped to reinforce Britain's
already expressed intention to fulfil her international obligations. In his television broadcast of August 31st, 1972, Sir Alec Douglas-Home stated: "Under
international law, a state had a duty to accept those of its nationals who have
nowhere else to go. ..

."

7

Both international and national tribunals have taken cognisance o1 passports to determine a
person's national status, but passports are not conclusive evidence of nationality. For a relevant
decision of an international tribunal, see Kahane (Successor) v. Parisi and the Austrian State, J.A.D.
(1929-30), No. 31, and for one of a national tribunal, see the Indian case of Ghaurul Hassan v. State
of Rajasthan, [19581 A.I.R. (Raj) 172.
"Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, September 16-23, page 25469. See also Lord
Hailsham's statement in the House of Lords to the same effect on September 14th, 1972,
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Weekly Hansard, September 11th-October 16th, 1972 at
Cols. 487-507.
7(1955) I.J.C. Rep. 4.
79
I.L.M. 1971, at p. 44. The decision in the Patel case may also have some relevance to the plight
of the Kenyan Asians and similar minorities.
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Sir Alec's statement does not express the view that a state has an unlimited
duty to permit the entry and settlement of its nationals, but only of those who
have nowhere else to go.8 0 It corresponds with the traditional view that
individuals have themselves no right to enter their state according to
81
international law.
The British government set up a special board to handle the resettlement of
British passport holders. 2 Mr. Godber, the Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, had talks on August 30th, 1972, in Vienna and Geneva
with Dr. Waldheim and with Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees. In his television broadcast of August 31, 1972, Sir
Alec announced the cancellation of the proposed loan to the Ugandan
government. Britain also approached 20 other governments for assistance with
the problem of the resettlement of the Ugandan Asians.
Despite British approaches to General Amin, and the mediation of General
Mobutu, President of the Republic of Zaire, General Amin refused to extend his
deadline for the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians. On September 27th, 1972,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked the General Assembly to put
the question of the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians on its agenda. The British
request was, however, withdrawn in the General Committee on September 29th,
1972, as it was thought that the mediation of General Mobutu would result in
concessions."
In his statement in the House of Commons of October 18th, 1972,4 Mr. Carr
mentioned the efforts made to secure the resettlement of the Ugandan Asians in
other countries. He also stated that, although stateless Asians would not be
admitted, those Ugandan Asians who had not genuinely renounced their
"The right of nationals to enter their country of origin is safeguarded by certain national
constitutional provisions. Amongst many examples one may instance article 16 of the Italian
Constitution and article 81 of the Kenyan Constitution of 1969. See also the Canadian case of
R. V. Soon Bin An (1941-42) A.D. 273, in which it was stated that one of the rights which flows
from Canadian citizenship is the right to return the native land. It may be doubted whether there is
yet a sufficient element of state practice or opinio juris to regard such a right as existing in
international customary law.
"Britain's acceptance of her responsibilities won widespread international acclaim. See, for
example, the statement made by Mr. Swaran Singh, Indian Minister of External Relations, in Lok
Sabha on September 4th, 1972: Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, December 2nd-9th, 1972, page
25600.
"Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, December 2nd-9th, 1972, page 25597.
"Ibid., at page 25599.
4
Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 910, 17th-19th, October, 1972, columns 262 et seq.
"This policy has resulted in great hardship, and the splitting up of families. Note Mr. Carr's
statement to the House of Commons concerning the persons in question on January 25th, 1973:
House of Commons; Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 920, at column 663. Note
also the speech of Mr. David Steel on February 21st, 1973, ibid., Issue No. 924, columns 599 et seq.
It is interesting to speculate whether the close relations of one of the expellees in question could
successfully argue that interference with their family life constituted a breach of article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. Certain heads of families, 300 in number, whose wives and
children were in England, were admitted as a result of M. Carr's discussions with the U.N. High
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British nationality would be.86
These persons would seem to include those to whom a Ugandan passport had
been issued, although they had not, in fact, renounced British nationality, and

persons who benefitted by the British Nationality Act, 1964, No. 1 section 2, and
article 19 of the British Protectorates Order, 1965. 81 It also appears that in
some cases, the Ugandan authorities had issued cyclostyled letters after issuing
a citizenship document, requiring the renunciation of British nationality within
90 days of the issue of the letter.
When a check was made on the nationality documents of Ugandan Asians,
the Ugandan authorities refused to accept the authenticity of the issue of these
letters, and many Asians were then treated as never having acquired Ugandan
nationality. As the British High Commission, it has been stated, compared the

dates of the letters and of the renunciation, not of the citizenship documentation
and the renunciation, the Asians received no assistance from the British

Nationality Act (No. I), 1964, where the period of time which elapsed between
the issue of the letters and the renunciation was less than 90 days. 88
Commissioner for Refugees: see Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 924,
16th-22nd; February, 1973, written answers at columns 146-7. He undertook to look sympathetically
at certain other cases.
6
Wives, aged parents and dependant children of U.K. citizens and nationals were also admitted:
see Mr. Carr's statement to the House of Commons on November 13th, 1972. Mr. Carr also stated
that apart from the admission of dependents, the only other persons who were admitted were those
who could claim no citizenship. Mr. Enoch Powell attempted to dispute this fact in a question which
he put to Mr. Carr on November 14th, 1972, in which he stated that a man born in Baroda in 1941,
who presumably obtained Indian citizenship in conformity with article 5 of the Indian Constitution,
was admitted to this country. See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Weekly Hansard,
Issue No. 914, 10th-16th November 1972, columns 37 and 97. Wives and dependents whose
husbands or fathers were not British passport holders, but who were themselves the holders of such
passports were admitted to the U.K.
"TOwing to the work of the British High Commissioner in Kampala, 2,000 were admitted.
However, certain Ugandan Asians who came to the U.K. could not prove their British nationality,
and hence were deported, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, Issue
No. 914, Nov. 13th column 35, for Mr. Douglas-Mann's questions as to the circumstances of the
deportation. One wonders as to the compatibility of the deportation with the Convention on the
Status of Refugees, 189, U.N.T.S. 150, article 33(1) of which provides: "No contracting state shall
expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to a territory where his life or freedom are
threatened on the ground of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." It seems that, should the U.K. return a refugee in such circumstances, she might
be acting in breach of an international obligation, if it were known that the only territory to which an
expelled person could go was such a territory; this might seem to be the case. However, it is possible
to distinguish between expulsion and refoulement, (i.e., as used by some international lawyers, the
returning of people across a frontier which they had improperly crossed), and to argue that the
obligations of the convention in question only apply where the refugee is already admitted. This
interpretation was given by the Swiss and Netherlands delegates to the conference which concluded
the Convention: see Summary Records of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 2/SR 25, page 21. It
does not, however, appear consistent with the wording of article 33, which refers to "Expulsion or
return.'
"The British authorities have based their action on section 24(2) of the Uganda Citizenship
Ordinance, which states:
The minister or any officer of the government authorised in that behalf by the minister may, in
any case in which he is satisfied that a person to whom subsection (6) of section 12 of the
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Owing to the fact that other members of the international community were
able to absorb British, Ugandan and stateless Asians,89 the influx into this
country was less than had been expected. As many of the individuals in question
have considerable technical, professional and commercial expertise, they should
be considerable assets to the community and their generally middle-class or
skilled artisan status should lessen problems of integration.9"
The British government has recently been discussing the question of
compensation for the Ugandan Asians with the Ugandan authorities91 but the
latter have not yet entered into formal negotiations. In his reply to questions put
to him by Mr. Sidney Chapman, Mr. Richard and Mr. George Cunningham, Sir
Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Relations, stated that compensation negotiations were proceeding on behalf of
the expelled Asians and that compensation should be paid in transferable currency. 92 On March 21st, 1973, Lord Balniel, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Relations, stated that the Ugandan government was expected to
pay full compensation in accordance with international law, but in view of the
fact that 2,000 British citizens remained in Uganda, caution should be exercised
before resort to retaliatory measures.93
Some have argued that Uganda should be suspended or expelled from the
94
commonwealth, and also denied commonwealth preference.
Heads of families of citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who were
expelled from Uganda, have been asked by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Constitution refers is, by reason of any circumstances not attributable to such person's default or
neglect, unable to renounce his citizenship of some country other than Uganda, or to take the
oath of allegiance, or to make or register any such declaration as is specified in the Fourth
Schedule to this act within the time presented in relation to that person in that subsection, or any
later date declared under this subsection, declare that the specified date in relation to this person
shall be such later date as will permit that person an opportunity of doing all acts, or all such acts
as remain to be done.
Quite a number of Ugandan Asians appear to have been affected by section 24(2), and it is to be
hoped that the British government may adopt a more sympathetic attitude to them in future.
89
Canada and India were especially helpful in this respect. Canada took 6,000 stateless, Ugandan
and British Asians; India took a large number of British Asians on a temporary basis, as well as
accepting responsibility for her own nationals.
0
" For an account of the resettlement of the Ugandan Asians in the British, see the Interim Report
of the Ugandan Resettlement Board, Cmnd. 5296.
1
They have not yet made any valuation of the properties taken over, and until they make such
valuations, the local remedies provided by sections 16(2)-16(5) of decree No. 29 of 1972 are
inoperative. Quarae whether the ability of property owners to make representations concerning the
valuations, or to take part in any legal proceedings concerning their property, would be considered a
denial of justice: see XV Government of Sweden (1959), European Year Book of Human Rights,
(1958-9), at page 354.
2
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 925, 26th Feb.-2nd
March 1973, cols. 1475-1480. The Harvard Draft of 1961, SSA J.I.L. (1961) 545, Articles 10, 12 and
39, requires payment in a convertible currency.
"Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 928, March 16th-23rd, cols. 626-629.
"See Mr. Cunningham's statement in the House of Commons on March 21st, 1973, suggesting
Uganda's suspension from the Commonwealth, and the withdrawal of preferences, Parliamentary
Debates. House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 928, 16th-22nd March 1973, Cols. 619-26.
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Office to fill in a form, giving details of their assets in Uganda for the
information of H.M. government. They have not been asked to estimate their
loss of profits, which may, according to some authorities, be claimed in the case
of discriminatory expropriation.9" It is not clear whether British protected
persons may fill in this form, although the British government is competent to
make claim in their behalf.96
International Reaction to the Expulsions
Although the British acceptance of their obligations won the respect of more
moderate members of the world community, no General Assembly resolution
was passed in 1972 on the question of the expulsions. While there have been a
number of mass expulsions since 1945, the level of activity of the political organs
of the United Nations in the area of mass expulsions has perhaps been
disappointing. Many emergent states have minorities whom they may distrust,
and they are, consequently perhaps, reluctant to condemn the policies of other
states.97
The Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities showed itself reluctant to put the question of
the rights of non-citizens on its agenda in 1972, and it failed to condemn
discrimination in expulsion policies. 98
On September 27, 1972, Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked the General
Assembly which was then holding its 27th session, to give urgent consideration
to the problem of the Ugandan Asians. He stated that the Ugandan action of
taking property without the assurance of prompt compensation was an
illustration of degradation and intolerance. 99 He also emphasized the
inadequacy of the deadline given for the evacuation of the Ugandan Asians. He
¢BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2nd. Ed.
9"MERVYN JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAw, Pub. 1956, page 195.

page 524, fn. 5.

"It is noteworthy that the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee's final Report on the Status
of Aliens of 1961 provides merely that states shall have the right to order the expulsion or
deportation of an undesirable alien in accordance with their local law.
"See the letter of Sept. 28, 1972, from the British member of the Commission, Mr. R.R. James of
Sussex University, to the Times. Owing to his pressure, the matter was eventually placed on the
Commission's agenda: see also Commission on Human Rights: Sub-commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 25th Session, Volume 11, E/CN 4 Sub. 2SR 651,
656-663.
"Note also the remarks of Mr. McCarthy, the British delegate at a later stage of the same session
of the General Assembly. The remarks are fully reported in the East African Standard of Dec. 21st,
1972, at page 1. The assembly was considering a draft paragraph endorsing a Trade and
Development Board resolution, which would leave expropriations to the domestic jurisdiction. Mr.
McCarthy stated expropriations must be for a public purpose, the property must not be taken on a
discriminatory basis, and prompt, adequate and effective compensation should be paid for it. The
legality of expropriations had, he said, to be decided according to international law. He expressed
his doubts as to the Ugandan ability to pay compensation. Mr. Okelo, the Ugandan delegate, stated
that compensation would be paid in respect of the take-over of foreign companies. General
Assembly, 27th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record, 2115th Meeting, 19th December, 1972.
A/PV2115.
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asked the members of the United Nations to help with the problem of
resettlement and to call on General Amin to extend his arbitrary and inhumane
deadline of 90 days, and to allow the Asians expelled to take their property with
them. On the same day, Sir Colin Crowe, the U.K. Permanent Representative at
the U.N., sent a letter to Dr. Waldheim proposing that the question of the
expulsion of the Ugandan Asians be put on the agenda.1 0
When the General Committee of the Assembly met, Sir Colin Crowe
emphasised the urgency of the matter and mentioned that the hardships caused
by the collective expulsion of a group raised issues germane to the wider purpose
of the Charter. He stated that members of the organisation had the obligation to
take joint and separate action to promote respect for and observance of human
rights. 101
His statement does not, however, make it clear whether he considered all
collective expulsion as being contrary to the human rights provisions of the
Charter, 10 2 or merely expulsions accompanied by special hardships.
Mr. Grace Ibingira, the Ugandan delegate opposing the U.K. draft resolution, which invited the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices,
and urged Uganda to respond to the initiatives of the Secretary-General
regarding time limits, and the transfer of the assets of the Asians, stated that the
matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of Uganda. He also said that the
Secretary-General was already negotiating with Uganda, and could do so
without a resolution. The Ugandan Asians were a relic of colonialism, but his
government would be responsible for their safety and their adequate
compensation. Owing, as has already been pointed out, to the mediation of
General Mobutu, the British delegation did not press for the inclusion of the
item on the agenda." 3
It might have been possible to ask for the imposition of mandatory sanctions
against Amin, and Britain would probably have been supported in the request
for such sanctions by certain African members of the Commonwealth and India,
had it not been realised that any attempt to impose sanctions might have meant
that the departing Asians were subjected to additional hardship and cruelties.
The determination, according to Chapter 7 of the Charter, of whether a state
has been guilty of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression
is a political one, and thus it would not have been difficult to impose the
sanctions mechanism of the United Nations, given a willingness to do so.
10 0Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, 1972, Dec. 2nd-9th, page 25599.
'"Note especially article 56 of the Charter.
'It seems that France cited both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the human
rights provisions in the Charter in protesting about the collective expulsion of French nationals from
Egypt in 1956. For the interesting rejoinder of Mr. Mahgoub of the Sudan to the French contention,
see G.A.O.R., 11th Session, 624th plenary meeting, 11th December, 1956, pages 745-746.
'See G.A.O.R., 27th Session, General Committee, 206th meeting; Press Releases GA/4618 and
GA/4622.
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Three international agencies assisted in solving the problem of the
resettlement of the Ugandan Asians, namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,' 0 4 the International Committee for European Migration,
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. On October 10th, 1972, Mr.
Godber had separate talks in Geneva on the problem of the stateless Asians with
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, officials of the I.C.R.C. and Mr. John Thomas, the
head of I.C.E.M.
On returning to London, he said that the problem arose, of providing the
stateless Asians with some kind of travel document, such that they might leave
Uganda and become the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who provided finance for the care, maintenance and transportation of the refugees. The Ugandan authorities eventually agreed to the
issue of temporary I.C.R.C. documents, on which were stamped the entry visa of
the country agreeing to take the stateless Asians, or those of undetermined
nationality.
The International Committee for European Migration coordinated the efforts
of 15 Latin American countries to help stateless Asians, and also organised an
airlift on behalf of 4,200 such Asians.
The International Legality of the
Ugandan Expulsions
General Considerations
Collective expulsions of aliens in peacetime have taken place on a number of
occasions since the war. It is doubtful what the precise rules of international law
concerning collective expulsions are, and what effect, if any, the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and General
Assembly resolutions concerning discrimination, have had in this area. 10 5 Most
international arbitral awards concerning expulsions are concerned with
individual expulsions. The most famous award concerning collective expulsions
was that given by Queen Victoria in 1839, which decided that Mexico was
justified in expelling a number of French citizens in time of war between the two
countries. 106
Despite the paucity of directly relevant material, it is thought that the
collective expulsion of Asians from Uganda may have been unlawful on several
grounds. The Ugandan Asians were not allowed to submit reasons against their
' 04See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, No. 3, December 1972, and the
supplement thereto.
10 'here is little post-war literature on the subject. For a discussion of the legality of the
expulsions of Hungarians from Yugoslavia in 1934, see Lubenhoff, Die Volkerrechtliche Lage auf
den Balkan, ZFAbVR 1934, at 127. For a discussion of the post-war expulsions of Germans from
Poland; see also Skubiszewski, Le Transfert de la Population allemande, CAHIERS
POLOGNE-ALLEMAGNE, 1959 at page 42.
06
1 LAPRADELLE ET POLITIS, RECUEIL DES ARBITRAGES INTERNATIONAUX, Vol. 1, pp. 564-566.
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expulsion, or to have their cases reviewed by any competent authority. General
Amin, as has been pointed out, attempted to justify the expulsions on economic
grounds,1"7 but the relevance of these grounds in all cases, and whether such
grounds are sufficient to justify mass expulsions, may be doubted. The Asians
had been mostly resident for a long time, and perhaps compelling reasons were
required for their expulsion. 108 The expulsions were prima facie discriminatory,
and in breach of the Charter of the United Nations concerning racial discrimination.
Although certain professional persons, and other categories of persons were
exempted from the operation of the expelling decrees,' 019 they were applicable
to the large majority of persons of certain racial origins irrespective of their
character or conduct. The expulsions may also have been in breach of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Asians were required to leave
without being granted an adequate time limit 1 ° and on occasions seem to have
been subjected to brutal treatment. The expulsion of the stateless Asians
appears to have been in breach of the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons.
The Expellee's Right to Make Representations,
and to Have Their Cases Reviewed
In the ChevreauIII case, which concerned the deportation of a Frenchman by
the British authorities from an area in Persia occupied by them in the belief that
he was a spy, the sole arbitrator, Beichmann, stated that: "In cases of arrests,
suspicions must be verified by a serious enquiry, in which the arrested person is
given opportunity to defend himself against the suspicions directed against
him."
Similar principles are thought to apply to deportations, even though
'O°See the Uganda Argus, August 5th and 7th, 1972, page 1, columns 4-5; August 9th, 1972, page
1, columns 2-4; August 10th, 1972, page 1, columns 2-4; August 12th, 1972, page 1, columns 7-8;
August 14th, 1972, page 8, columns 3-6; August 16th, page 1, columns 1-4 and page 4, columns 3-8;
August 18th, page 4, columns 3-8; August 30th, page 2, columns 1-8. General Amin generally
appears to have attempted to justify the expulsion of the Asians because of their economic
misconduct: in the statements reported on August 12th, he seems to have justified the expulsion of
the Asians on the ground of their economic power.
'Ilt has been suggested, however, by some modern publicists that states are no longer bound to
give reasons for the expulsion of aliens, and that the question as to whether adequate reasons exist
for expulsion is not subject to the determination of an international tribunal according to general

international law. For this view see, for example, AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2nd ed. at page 560. Schwarzenberger appears uncertain as to whether the
priciples of international law regarding the expulsion of aliens which were stated in a number of
pre-1914 arbitrations are still valid: see InternationalLawand Order, pub. Stevens 1971, at pages
90 and 275. The discussion of the cases concerning expulsion in Cheng's GeneralPrinciplesof Law
Recognised by Civilised Nations, at page 34, is especially interesting and helpful.
1
° See Uganda Statutory Instruments, 1972, No. 124.
"10For the necessity of granting expellees an adequate time limit, see Hollander's case, U.S. v.
Guatemala, MooRE's DIGEST, Volume IV page 102.
'"lI U.N.R.I.A.A., page 1113.
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deporting states may not be signatories of the United Nations Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.112 Article 13 of this covenant provides that aliens
shall be allowed to submit reasons against their expulsion, and have their cases
reviewed by, and be represented before, the competent authority for this
purpose, unless compelling reasons of national security otherwise require.
International customary law may possibly now contain principles similar to
that of article 13. The law of many countries provides for representations to be
made against deportation orders, and for their review by courts and tribunals.I 3
The making of a deportation order without granting such safeguards may be
contrary to international law except in cases of urgency.
There appears to have been no opportunity given to the victims of General
Amin's mass expulsion to make representations concerning them, either before
or after the making of the relevant decrees, and it does not appear that they had
any legal means of securing the review of the expulsion orders by the courts or
otherwise.""4 The Ugandan Immigration Act 1969, section 14 does not provide
"prohibited immigrants" subject to deportation with any such remedies,
although it seems, there would be nothing to stop an immigrant subject to
deportation from asking the Minister to review his decision.
The only representations that were made by the Asian community concerning
the changes made by General Amin against them were at the conference
mentioned in 1971, when no question had arisen of the making of deportation
orders. Persons exempted from the operation of the expelling decrees were not
"'G.A. Resolution 2200 (XXI).
"'In the United Kingdom, appeals to adjudicators and to Immigration Appeals rlibunals are
allowed against decisions to make deportation orders under section 3(5) of the Immigration Act,
1971 (ibid., section 15(1) and 15(7)), except where the ground of decision is that the deportation
order is conducive to the public good as being in the interests of national security, or the relations
between the U.K. and another country, or for any other reason of a political nature [ibid., section
15(3)]. Appeals to the Minister's advisers will be possible in the latter cases: see Statement of Immigration Rules for Control after Entry, Commonwealth Citizens, Parliamentary Paper No. 80, para
35 and Statement of Immigration Rules for Control After Entry, EEC and other NonCommonwealth Nationals, Parliamentary Paper No. 82, para. 42. Both papers were printed on
January 25th, 1973. In the U.S., section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952,
provides for a special procedure of inquiry before a deportation order is made. In Germany, aliens
may make representations when the question of making a deportation order is being considered,
and such order may be challenged on formal grounds in the administrative courts. The latter is
implicit in the Ausliindergesetz of 1965, article 21. In France, aliens admitted to residence, except in
cases of extreme urgency, are entitled to a hearing before an advisory board, whose decision is not
binding on the Minister, before a deportation order is made: see the Decree of March 18th, 1946,
article 24 and 25, D. 1946, 148. Belgian law is similar: see article 5 and 10 of the law of March 28th,
1952. In Latin America, judicial or administrative remedies are generally available against decisions
to expel. In Kenya, the Immigration Act of 1968, Cap. 172, does not provide that persons subject to
deportation may make representations, or enjoy a right of appeal against the decision to make a
deportation order. The position seems to be the same in some other African States, such as
Tanzania.
"'If the human rights provisions of the Ugandan Constitution of 1967 may be regarded as still in
being, perhaps the expellees could have asked the High Court for redress on the ground of being
deprived of their security of persons, and being subjected to inhuman and degrading punishments:
see articles 8(2), 12 and 22 of the 1967 Constitution. For political reasons, it would have been hard
for the High Court to deal with the issue.
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so exempted as a result of their representations, or of the decision of a court or
tribunal, but as a result of the exercise of a ministerial discretion on economic
grounds. The expelling decrees provide no means of redress for persons affected
by them.
It might be argued that no such principle of international customary law, as
the one contended for exists, or if it does, there were special circumstances,
given the number of persons involved, and the possible urgency of the matter,
rendering it inoperative in the present case.
The Adequacy of the PossibleReasons
for the Expulsions
Even if these doubtful contentions be accepted it remains that General Amin
apparently had no adequate grounds for expelling the non-citizen Asian
community. The expulsion may thus be unlawful abuse of Uganda's rights even
'
if no account be taken of their discriminatory nature. Is
It appears that the British government never formally asked General Amin
the reasons for his expulsion of the Asians, nor did it formally protest the expulsion itself, but contented itself with endeavouring to obtain an extension of time
for the departing Asians. It also tried to ensure that they could take certain of
their property with them. The absence of such of a British protest does not mean
that Britain has conceded that Uganda has an unlimited right of expulsion.
It may have been thought that a formal protest would exacerbate matters,
and lead to further expulsions, or to increased hardships for those already the
subject of deportation orders. Britain, and other states, have demanded reasons
for collective expulsions in the past, and have protested about them."16
Expulsions have often been the subject of international arbitrations. Although
the large majority of international arbitral awards relating to expulsions have
concerned the expulsion of individuals, the principles enunciated in them are
perhaps applicable a fortiori to the case of collective expulsions.
As already stated, the authority of certain of the older awards has been
questioned, 1 1 7 but it is thought that the legal principles stated in them can still
"'It may also be that the expellees could be considered Uganda's effective nationals in
accordance with the principle in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), I.CJ. Reports
1955, at page 4.
"'Thus in 1923, Bulgaria protested to the Council of the League concerning the expulsions of
Bulgarians from Western Thrace: See JOURNAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1923, pages 562-3,
578. France argued before the General Assembly in 1956 that the collective expulsion of French
citizens from Egypt was contrary to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
see G.A.O.R., 1lth session, Plenary Meetings, pp. 784-5, for M. Giscard d' Estaing's statement. The
alleged collective expulsion of twelve British nationals from Kenya in 1967 led to a demand from the
British High Commissioner, to know the reasons, and a request for extension of time: see B.P.I.L.
1967, pp. 112-14.
"'See especially Prof. Cheng's discussion of Boffolo's case, X.U.N.R.I.A.A. 528, in his work
GeneralPrinciples of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations, pub. Stevens, at page 35, Fn. 6. Prof.
Cheng argues that Boffolo's case is only authority for the proposition that expulsion may be an
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be upheld. It appears that, when an international tribunal is presented with
serious reasons for the expulsion of an alien, it will normally treat them as
conclusive. I'"A considerable margin of appreciation must be granted to a state
in matters appertaining to its sovereignty.
However, where an unusual or unexpected use is made of the power of expulsion, as has the collective and apparently discriminatory expulsion of thousands
of established aliens which use is detrimental to the interests of the expellees
and their receiving states, it is thought that the principle stated in Boffolo's case
that an international tribunal may consider whether the reasons advanced for
an expulsion are adequate is still applicable. Under the circumstances of the
present case, the expulsions may have been an abuse of Uganda's rights. It is
possible that the prohibition of the abuse of rights is a general principle of law
recognized by civilised nations:'1 9 the principle has sometimes been applied by
12 0
the International Court of Justice.
If the principles applied in the pre-1914 cases concerning expulsions are no
longer applicable, then it appears that the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter, 2 ' possibly the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which according to some has attained the force of international
international wrong, if not reasons for it are given. It was not necessary to the decision of the umpire,
Ralston, to state that an international tribunal may look at the adequacy of the reasons given for an
expulsion. International tribunals, have, however, done so in the Chase case, MOORE'S
INTERNATIONAL ARnITRATIONS, Volume IV page 3336, and in the Zerman case, Loc. at., at page
3348.
"'See the Hochbaum case, A.D. (1933-34) Case No. 134.
"'English and Italian law give little scope to the concept of the abuse of rights. Although article
226 of the BGB, prohibits the abuse of rights, the German courts have interpreted their article
narrowly. Gutteridge doubted whether the prohibition of the abuse of rights was a general principle
of law: see 38 Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1952, pages 125 et seq.
"'See SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER, pages 106-9 for discussion of the
relevant cases, and also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 1951, I.C.J. Reports at page 141-2.
..Ithas frequently been argued that the human rights provisions of the Charter are limited by the
domestic jurisdiction provisions of article 2(1) thereof, and that article 56 of the Charter only
imposes an obligation on states to take separate action to promote the co-operation to be brought
about by the organisation. It is thought that, as human rights are the subject matter of a treaty, the
United Nations Charter, serious breaches of such rights cannot be within the domestic jurisdiction.
The practice of the General Assembly does not conduce to an extreme form of the first proposition.
See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE POLITICAL ORGANS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at page 118 et seq.; LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RsGcrrs, Chapter 10: Markovic in Nobel Symposium on the InternationalProtection of Human
Rights at page 47, and T.E.S. Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in the
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGrrs, ed. Luard at page 286 for discussions of the
question of domestic jurisdiction. The second proposition was put forward by KELSEN, LAW OF THE
U.N. at page 100. Brierly and Scelle advanced the view in the International Law Commission, that
the Charter imposes an obligation on members not to enforce racially discriminatory law: see U.N.
Document No. A/CN 4/SR 14 at pp. 9-13. (1949). Judge Tanaka expressed the view in his Dissenting
opinion in the South West Africa cases of 1966, that the Charter imposes obligations on members in
the field of human rights: see I.C.J. Reports 1966, at page 289. The International Court expressed
the same view in its Advisory Opinion on the Presence of South Africa in Namibia, I.C.J. Reports
1971, at para. 131. It seems fairly clear from the provisions of the Charter that states are placed
under obligations in the field of human rights.
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customary law,1"2 and the norm of international law which seems to have
crystallised recently, prohibiting racial discrimination,' 23 all have the effect of
making discriminatory expulsions contrary to international law.
This norm is based on articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, the
many resolutions of the General Assembly condemning apartheid,' 24 the International Covenants on Human Rights, 2 ' the regional instruments relating
thereto, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 6 and also on the provisions of many national constitutions. Such
7
laws prohibiting
constitutions often prohibit discrimination against aliens:
such
discrimination
to
applicable
and
racial
discrimination
of
certain forms
against aliens, are in force in the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom."'
'"See the opinion of Waldock to this effect in the supplement to the I.C.L.Q. for 1965, at page 15.
The view expressed by Wengler in his Volkerrecht page 1026, that some of its most important
provisions have become accepted as international customary law, appears reasonable. For an
instructive recent analysis of the effect of the Universal Declaration, see Bleicher, The Legal
Significance of the Recitation of GeneralAssembly Resolutions, A.J.I.C. 1%9, page 444, at pages
461-5. The declaration has sometimes been regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the
human rights resolution of the Charter. Whatever the legal effect of the declaration may be, it has
great moral force, and has greatly assisted in the crystallization of the customary norm forbidding
racial discrimination.
For the view that international customary law prohibits racial discrimination see the Dissenting
Opinions of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.CJ. Reports, 286 et seq., and of
Judge Padella Nervo, at pages 464-8 in the same case. See also JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LANOUR STANDARDS, 1960, at page 87.
'"See, for example, Resolutions 616B (VII), 1248 (XIII), 1375 (XIV), 1598 (XV), 1663 (XVII),
2446 (XXIII), 2646 (XXV) and 2647 (XXV). One may observe an increasing tendency for General
Assembly resolutions condemning racial discrimination to be earned by a unanimous or nearly
unanimous vote. Although it is not thought that resolutions of the General Assembly can themselves
create customary law, it may be that, given such an overwhelming opiniojuris,as is manifested by
these resolutions, little state practice is required for the formation of an international customary
norm of non-discrimination. Although Uganda has voted for certain of these resolutions, it is
doubtful whether such a vote effects an estoppel.
'The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, like the European Convention on Human Rights,
article 1, "Applicable to Racial Discrimination against Aliens," see article 2(1) thereof.
"T'his convention does not permit discrimination against aliens on the ground of race: although
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences may be made by a state party to the convention
between citizens and non-citizens, they may not be made on the ground of race: article 1(1) and
article 1(2) of the convention. The convention is notable for the number of parties to it, which do not
include Uganda, and for its sophisticated definition of the term discrimination.
"'Thus article 14 of the Indian Constitution says that the state shall not deny to any person
equality before the law, or equal protection within the territory of India. It has been held to forbid
differential treatment of French and Portuguese citizens in obtaining liquor licences: Menzies v.
State of Madras, 1952 2 M.LJ. 237. The Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, section l(1)(b) also forbids
racial discrimination; the German Constitution, article 3, states that all persons shall be equal
before the law, and that no person shall be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, parentage,
race, language, homeland and origin, faith or religious or political opinions. This article applies to
aliens and nationals.
"'For accounts of these laws, see J. Jowell, The Administrative Enforcement of Laws Against
Discrimination, PUBLIC LAw 1965, at page 119, which describes the position in the United States
and Canada, and LESTER AND BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW, pub. 1972. See also WHITEMAN'S
DIGEST, Volume 8, page 378, and BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd
ed. at page 580.
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States rarely engage in the collective and discriminatory expulsion of aliens,
and when they do, protests often occur.129 This fact, added to the general state
of opinio juris and state practice in the area of racial discrimination, suggests
that such expulsions are contrary to customary law if effected on a racial basis.
The suggestion that discriminatory collective expulsions are contrary to the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has
already been put forward by Egypt and France in the General Assembly. 30 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been thought by many publicists to
be relevant to the question of collective expulsions; thus Max Huber, George
Scelle and Belladore Pallieri all regarded transfers of population as contrary to
certain of the provisions of the Declaration. 3 ' It is thought that, where
discriminatory expulsions have some objective basis, and are not a disproportionate measure in the given circumstances, they are not contrary to the
Declaration. This follows from article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration.' 32
The expulsions from Uganda appear to be contrary to the norm of international customary law prohibiting racial discrimination, which has evolved
from the sources already mentioned, which include the Declaration. Insofar as
the expulsions are contrary to the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and to
this newly emergent rule of international customary law, it would apparently be
necessary in order to validate them for Uganda, to show that the distinction
made between the aliens who were allowed to remain and those expelled, which
had an objective justification,' 33 and the means employed, namely, the
34
expulsion was proportional to the justification for the differentiation.
"'Such protests sometimes took place before the United Nations was founded. Thus the U.S.
protested to Spain about proposed discriminatory collective expulsion of American Negroes from
Cuba during the nineteenth century: see MooRE's DIGEST, Volume 4, page 104.
1"0 Fawzi Bey, the Egyptian delegate, speaking in the first Committee of the General Assembly in
1948, stated that the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine was contrary to both article 3 and article 6 of
the Universal Declaration: G.A.O.R., 3rd Session, First Committee, 22nd Meeting, page 868. M.
Giscard D'Estaing cited both the Universal Declaration, article 3 and article 7, and the human
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter in his statement to the General Assembly in 1956
concerning the collective and apparently discriminatory expulsion of 3,672 French nationals from
Egypt in 1956. See G.A.O.R., I1th Session, 624th Plenary Meeting, at pages 124-5. In the debate in
the General Assembly, both the Sudanese and Egyptian delegates stated that the expulsions were
within the domestic jurisdiction of Egypt.
"'.See Annuaire de LInstitut de DroitInternational,1952, at pages 165, 180 and 198.
It is noteworthy that on March 21st, 1973, Lord Balniel, Member of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Relations, stated that the Ugandan expulsions were contrary to the Universal
Declaration as well as to general international law; see Parl. Deb. House of Commons, Weekly
Hansard, Issue No. 928, March 16th-23rd, cols. 626-9.
.This article finds many parallels in national constitutions and in the European Convention of
Human Rights. It provides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as
are determined by law, solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others, and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in democratic society.
"..Note the provisions of the Ugandan expelling decrees, number 17 and 30 of 1972.
"'See Judge Tanaka, I.C.J. Reports (1966) at pages 302-16 and the Belgian Linguistics Case, 8
I.L.M., page 825.
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The burden of proving these matters would, it seems, be on Uganda.13 In the
unlikely event of Uganda agreeing to international arbitration in respect of the
collective expulsions, or in the event of their legality being referred to the International Court of Justice for its decision, it seems unlikely that Uganda would
succeed in establishing that there were adequate grounds for expelling the
Asians, who were treated differently from other categories of aliens.
As already pointed out, the justification put forward by General Amin for
expelling the Asians was mainly economic in character. 13 6 There seem to have
been three economic reasons for his expulsion of the Asians. They were sometimes guilty of economic crimes, such as tax evasion and evasion of exchange
control regulations; they also were sometimes guilty of exploitation of Africans,
and occupied too prominent a position in Ugandan economy.
Although it is true that certain categories of professional persons were
exempted from General Amin's decrees expelling the Asians,' 37 it can scarcely
be that all non-citizen Asians resident in Uganda came within the ambit of the
three reasons mentioned. The objective justification for the differentiation
between the non-citizen Asians and the other categories of aliens seems to have
been lacking. Even if one assumes there was such a justification, the expulsion
of all the non-citizen Asians, was utterly disproportionate to the economic
reasons advanced for it.
It would have been possible for the Ugandan authorities instead of embarking
on their programme of mass expulsions, to have prosecuted individuals who
were guilty of economic crimes. Further programmes of nationalisation, or of
Africanisation, extending to smaller business, would have diminished the
importance of the Asians in the commercial sector. The expulsion of the Asians
seems a specially indefensible action when it is remembered that many of them
had been resident for generations in Uganda.138
'Judge Tanaka, Dissenting Opinion at page 309.
"'Note President Amin's speeches of August 4th, 7th, 12th, 13th and 29th, 1972, and that ofMr.
Kebedi at the Summit conference of East and Central African governments in Dar-es-Salaam on
7th-9th September 1972. Note also the references to the Ugandan press already mentioned.
Decree No. 17, section 2 and Schedule 1; Decree No. 30, section 1.
The fact that the Uganda Immigration Act of 1969, sections 10(5) and 11(2), allow the
cancellation of entry permits and certificates of residence at the absolute discretion of the Minister
and without assigning any reason, cannot justify the expulsions, which, from the viewpoint of
international law, were racially discriminatory.
It has been suggested by Dr. R. Plender that international customary law may protect a vested
right to residence; see his InternationalImmigrationLaw at pp. 94-98. He cites no cases to support
his contention, and he admits that it may be that vested rights must have fixed value before they are
capable of protection. Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 63 at page 88. It may be doubted
whether any Asians had such a right. Certain Asians had enjoyed the status of permanent residents,
as defined by sections of the Immigration (Control) Act, 1948, as also had certain other persons, but
this status was lost as a result of the Immigration Act, 1963, 1963, section 7(1)B, and the Asians in
question had to apply for entry permits and certificates of residence.
It appears that when state succession occurs, the new sovereign may apply its laws to divest
individuals of rights acquired against the old sovereign: Chicago Railway Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.
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Economic grounds have rarely been advanced for a mass expulsion of
aliens.' 3 9 The economic necessity for the expulsion can be questioned on the
further ground that most of the Asians would have gradually left Uganda of
their own volition, before their entry permits and certificates of residence were
expected to expire in 1977.
When General Amin gave his ultimatum to the British government, on
August 5th, 1972, to arrange for the evacuation of its Asian citizens, he stated
that the Asians had been guilty of sabotaging the Ugandan economy, and were
after all, Britain's responsibility. Mr. Kebedi, the Ugandan Foreign Minister,
repeated the same remarks in his interview with the British press on the same
day."' ° One of the reasons which apparently motivated General Amin to expel
the Asians, was the fear that owing to the operation of the British immigration
legislation, and of the voucher system, the departure of the Ugandan Asians
would be unduly delayed. Although certain of the Asians were ultimately
Britain's responsibility, this in itself could not justify their discriminatory expulsion. Given the British allocation of special vouchers to its Asian citizens in
Uganda, the whole British Asian community might have been expected to have
14
left in ten years' time. 1
General Amin did not state that the expulsions were a reprisal for Britain's
refusal to grant a larger number of special vouchers to her Ugandan citizens and
nationals. 42 Reprisals which may be contrary to international jus congene143
can hardly be in conformity with international law.' 44
542 (1885); see also Kaeckenbeeck, The Protectionof Vested Rights in InternationalLaw, B.Y.I.L.
1936, page 1, at page 17. The national states of the Asians have not sought compensation in respect
of the loss of the vested rights as from October 1st, 1965, and perhaps they have now acquiesced in
their expropriation without compensation on the assumption that the rights can be internationally
protected.
It has also been suggested by Dr. Plender that international law may protect a vested right to
trade, and hence indirectly, a vested right of residence: see his article, The Exodus of Asians from
East and CentralAfica, AJ.C.L. 1971, page 287, at pages 309-312. Whether or not international
law can protect such vested rights, it seems clear that none of the Ugandan Asians had an
irrevocable right to trade either by the Trading Act of 1939, or by the Trade Licensing Act of 1969.
According to each Act, licences were granted on an annual basis, but would be renewed: Trading
Act 1939, section 8(4): Trade Licensing Act, 1969, section 12.
39
National legislation does not generally provide that aliens can be expelled for economic reasons,
unless they have committed crimes. In 1892, the Institute of International Law attempted an
exhaustive definition of the reasons for individual expulsions: economic reasons were not included,
as is hardly surprising under the different economic conditions prevailing at that time. See Annuaire
de L'Institut de Droit International, 1892-4 at pages 223 et seq.
"'Justin O'Brien, op. cit., supra, at page 9.
...42Ibid., at pages 8-10.
1 He did, however, state that he had been inspired by God, and intended
to teach Britain a lesson
when he made his original announcement concerning the expulsions: see Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, September 6th-13th, 1972, column 25469.
" 3See the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Reports,
1966 at para 298, which states that human rights, being dervied from natural law, are part of thejus
cogene.
"'In the nineteenth century, collective expulsions were sometimes stated to be justifiable as a
reprisal. Rolin Jacquelmyns, the distinguished Belgian jurist stated that the collective expulsion of
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It is doubtful whether any other reasons which General Amin could advance
for the expulsions would be regarded as adequate by an international tribunal,
or sufficient to rebut the presumption that racial discrimination, as opposed to
permissible discrimination, has occurred, when a whole community of a given
race has been expelled. Clearly it could not be argued that all the members of
the community had been involved in political conspiracy.145
It seems that the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians was an act of racial
discrimination, as such contrary to international law, and that no adequate
reasons have been, or can be advanced, which would enable it to be treated as a
permissible differentiation.
Other Possible Grounds of Illegality
According to the HollanderCase, 146 which was decided during the early part
of this century, an alien should not be expelled without being given the
opportunity to make arrangements for his family and business. The departing
Asians were not enabled to make satisfactory arrangements for the disposition
of their property, as the agents appointed by those who departed after October
4, 1972 had little power of independent action,' 7 whilst those who departed
before October 4th, and who sold their properties, found that the sales were
retrospectively invalidated, and certain of the properties vested immediately in
148
the Abandoned Property Custodian Board.
It may be contended however, that if the latter category of persons had stayed
longer they could have made more lasting provisions for their property by

aliens in peacetime is only permissible by way of a reprisal: see his article Droit dExpulsion des

Etrangers, REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1888, at page 498. Indonesia justified her expulsion of
Dutch nationals in 1957 on the grounds of Holland's failure to negotiate over West Irian. Dahm,
rightly, it is submitted, considers this justification as having no foundation in international law:
Volkerrecht, Volume 1 at page 529.
Even if modern international law were presumed to permit a category of reprisal which may be
contrary to international jus cogene, the conditions for the exercise of the reprisal as defined in the
Naulilaa Case, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A., page 1013, were not present. The dispute between Britain and
Uganda as to the annual quota of Asians who should be admitted to this country was never referred
to the Security Council for settlement, as the parties were required to do by article 37(1) of the
Charter. Britain's refusal to accept more than a certain quota of Ugandan Asians for settlement was
not a breach of a duty owed to Uganda. Even if it be assumed that it was a breach of a duty owed to
the Asians, by which Uganda was specially damnified, it cannot be that the reprisals were in
conformity with international customary law, as they lacked all proportionality, and also were
directed against Indian, Pakistani, Bangladesh, Zambian, Kenyan and Tanzanian subjects, as well
as against stateless persons.
"'MoORE'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume IV, pages 107-8.
.'.Note Decree No. 29 of 1972, section 1 (4)-1(6).
1'TDecree No. 27, sections 9 and 4(5). It does not seem that international customary law prohibits
all retroactive legislation, although where such legislation invalidates transactions already
undertaken, it may be specially objectionable. International customary law may prohibit retroactive
criminal legislation, but even this is not entirely certain. See Wengler, Volkerrecht, Volume 1, page
27, fn 2, and page 545, fn. 2. See also the European Convention of Human Rights, article 7.
M'Some of them continued to get their money out of the country through Kenya.
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appointing agents.' 49 There also appears to be no rule of international
customary law stating that the property of expellees may not be expropriated, or
that dispositions of property undertaken by them may not be retrospectively
invalidated. The legality of the expropriations of the Asian property is discussed
in the next section of this paper.
If the Asians were submitted to brutal or humiliating treatment before their
departure, this could be made the subject of a claim before an international
tribunal. As already pointed out, however, the Ugandan authorities, with
certain exceptions, appear to have behaved in a restrained way. The relevant
cases are the Maal Case, 50 and Ben Tillett's Case."' In the former case, the
state of a national who was stripped naked and subjected to the ridicule of a
mob recovered damages in respect of this inhuman treatment.
The Jurisdiction of the International Court
in Relation to the Expulsions
Although Uganda appears to have acted in breach of her international obligations in expelling the Asians, it seems doubtful whether the question of the
legality of the expulsions will be referred to the International Court of Justice.
India and Uganda reserve inter-commonwealth disputes from the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, and the parties are unlikely to refer the
question of the expulsion to the International Court by special agreement. It is
possible that if the question of the Ugandan expulsions or expropriations was
referred to the International Court by special agreement, Uganda might
contend that Britain had no genuine and effective link with the expelled Asians,
and so could not protect them.
If genuine and effective links had existed in the past, Uganda might argue
that such links had become disrupted by Ugandan independence, and were not
opposable to her, as the most effective link that the Asians had was with
Uganda. It is doubtful whether Uganda would make such a submission, as it
might be regarded as equivalent to a conclusion that she had expelled persons
who were by international law her own nationals, if the principle in the
Nottebohm case" 2 is capable of being extended somewhat.
Several rejoinders would be possible to such a Ugandan contention. It might
be argued that it is doubtful whether the Nottebohm case is rightly decided,

" It was suggested in an article in The Times by Louis Heren on August 30th, 1972, that General
Amin may have suspected that there was an Asian plot against him: see page 13, columns 1 and 2
for this article.
0

'S RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, page 914.

'51Cmnd.
52

9235 (1899).
' I.CJ. Reports, 1955, at page 4. It has often been suggested that aliens who have close links with
a given country should be immune from expulsion. See the United Nations Study of Expulsion of
Immigrants, ST/SOA/22, at paragraph 37.
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exchanging as it does, the certainties of nationality for the uncertainties of other
less-well-defined criteria. The requirement of a genuine and effective link was
not adopted by the Italo-United States Claims Commission in the Flegenheimer
case. 53
Even if the Nottebohm case be considered as rightly decided, its principles
may only be applicable to the acquisition of nationality by naturalisation, and
not to the maintenance of bonds based usually upon birth in a former British
protectorate. It is also thought that an international tribunal would be disposed
to presume that a genuine and effective link existed, as the Ugandan Asians who
retained their British protected status or citizenship of the United Kingdom and
colonies, were permitted to do so to prevent them from becoming stateless
persons as a result of their failure to register as Ugandan citizens.
It might also be maintained that Ugandan Asians who failed to register as
Ugandan citizens, showed their desire to maintain links with the United
Kingdom. Many of them intended to go there if they could, and many had
business, financial or family connections with this country; some went there for
educational and other purposes.
Although there is some controversy as to the exact scope of the principle of
estoppel or preclusion in public international law, it is noteworthy that General
Amin repeatedly stated that the Asians had not sufficiently integrated
themselves into Uganda, and that many of them had maintained connections
with Britain. Further, when General Amin first announced his decision to expel
the Asians, he described them as Britain's responsibility, by which he must have
meant that those of British citizenship or nationality were the responsibility of
this country. It may be, however, that the latter statement would be construed
merely to mean that Britain was bound to allow their admission. It does not
seem that Uganda has contested Britain's right to make representations on
behalf of the expelled Asians.
It is not thought that the principle of the Nottebohm case is applicable to the
Ugandan expulsions. If it is, then it may not be to the expropriations of the
property of the departed Asians who left for the United Kingdom, since these
occurred after the Asians had established a genuine link with the U.K. by
returning to it. The Ugandan authorities have not contested the right of the
British High Commission in Kampala to enter into preliminary negotiations
regarding compensation.
Many of the Asians of Indian, Pakistani and other expellee nationalities
maintained links with their country of origin, and link of birth or descent must
be sufficient to establish an effective connection. It is interesting to note that the
Pakistani acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction contains no reservation of
inter-commonwealth disputes and that she left the Commonwealth in January
"'3 I.L.R., 25, Volume 1 of 1958 at page 91.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. I
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1972.1 " As Pakistan has herself sometimes been accused of collective expulsions
of Hindus and Christians, it seems unlikely that she would refer the question of
the Ugandan expulsions to the International Court of Justice. 5'
It has been suggested in this paper that the expulsions from Uganda were a
clear infringement of the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter, which, it is thought, prevail over the clause of domestic jurisdiction,
and impose obligations on states. The expulsions were also, as it is thought, an
infringement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of the
customary norm of international law, prohibiting racial discrimination, which
derives partly from the Universal Declaration, and partly from other sources.
It seems that states which are members of the United Nations and also parties
to the optional clauses, and which have not made reservations thereto of which
Uganda could take advantage, 156 may obtain a declaration from the
International Court to the effect that Uganda has broken her obligations under
the Charter in expelling the Asians. 1"' States parties to the statute which are
parties to the optional clause, might likewise obtain a declaration from the
International Court, that Uganda has broken her obligations under International customary law. Both the expulsion of aliens of a given nationality and
of stateless aliens, can be considered as infringements of the legal norms
mentioned.
It may be that, under the suggested circumstances, it would be possible to
suggest that no real dispute existed. Judges Morelli and Fitzmaurice have both
been responsible for useful analysis of the meaning of the term "dispute." '1 8
Both judges require that one of the states must have made a claim or protest
before a dispute can be said to exist. According to Judge Fitzmaurice, a legal
dispute only exists if its outcome in the form of a decision of the International
Court can effect the legal interests or relation of the parties in the sense of
imposing on one of them a legal right, or obligation, or operating as an
injunction or prohibition for the future or as a ruling material to a still
subsisting legal situation.
A judgment that Uganda has violated her legal obligations, and must not
engage in discriminatory collective expulsions in the future, may be considered
to come within the ambit of the last two categories required by Judge
"'See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Feb. 19-26th, 1972, at page 25114.
"'Bangladesh has not yet become a party to the Optional Clause: Zambia and Tanzania are also
not parties; Kenya is a party, but reserves inter-Commonwealth disputes from the jurisdiction of the
court.
" Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria Case 1939, Series A/B, No. 77, page 80-82.
"It may be noted that the breaches of the Charter were specially serious.
"'See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli in the South West Africa Case, (Preliminary
Objection), 1962, I.C.J. Reports at pages 566-68, and the Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in
the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, (Preliminary Objection), I.CJ. Reports, 1963 at
pages 108-111.
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Fitzmaurice. It may, however, be contended that only the national states of the
expelled aliens have a legal interest in the expulsions, and that a mere humanitarian interest is insufficient. On the otfier hand, it may be that all states have
an interest in the fulfillment of the obligations which the Charter of the United
Nations and international customary law impose on states in the field of human
rights.159
Given the political will, it would be possible for the General Assembly or the
Security Council to refer the question of the compatibility of collective
expulsions with the obligations of the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and international customary law, to the International Court for its advisory opinion.
Unfortunately, neither of the courses of action suggested is likely to occur.
The use of the International Court has been declining in recent years. States
may be unwilling to obtain a definition of international obligations which might
be politically embarrassing, and they have generally only referred disputes to the
court in which they are directly concerned. There is little likelihood of either of
the political organs seeking an advisory opinion on the matters in question.
The state of Uganda is placed under special obligations to stateless aliens in
virtue of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, to which she
is a party. It appears that she may have broken these obligations, under this
convention. Article 31 of the convention provides:
Contracting states shall not expel such a stateless person lawfully in their territory,
save on grounds of national security or public order.
For the reasons already stated, it is not thought that the Ugandan authorities
could justify the expulsions on either of these grounds. The Asians threatened
neither the national security nor the public order of Uganda, whatever margin
of appreciation be granted to that country.
Article 32 of the convention provides:
The expulsion of such a stateless person shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of
national security otherwise require, the stateless person shall be allowed to submit
evidence to clear them and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before the
competent authority, or a person or persons designated by the competent authority.
The contracting states shall allow such a stateless person a reasonable period within
which to seek legal admission into another country.

" Note the contrary opinion of the majority of the International Court of Justice in the South
West Africa Cases of 1966, IJ.C. Reports, 1966, at pages 31-33. It is thought that the dissenting
opinion of Judge Jessup is to be preferred. See especially pp. 385-9 of this opinion. Reference may
also be made to the opinions of Judge Wellington Koo at pages 25-9; of Judge Koretsky at page
242-8; of Judge Tanaka at pages 251-4; of Judge Padilla Nervo at pages 461-67; of Judge Forster at
pages 418-82; and of Judge Mbanefo at pages 501-5.
The International Court in its judgment in the Darcelona Traction Case at para 34 stated that all
states have an interest in the observance of certain fundamental human rights.
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It seems equally clear that Uganda has not fulfilled the international obligations contained in article 32 of the convention. She also appears to have broken
those contained in article 3, according to which parties to the convention
undertake to apply its terms without discrimination on the grounds of race.
Disputes as to the interpretation and application of the convention are
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court, according to the
provisions of article 34 of the convention. As this is a convention having broad
humanitarian objectives it is thought that any state party to the convention
could refer the question of Uganda's fulfillment thereof to the International
Court. The question of such fulfillment would, of course, be decided in
accordance with international law.
The expulsion of the Ugandan Asians has not resulted in any international
litigation. This has been unfortunate as the area of the collective expulsion of
aliens is a somewhat obscure one, and it would have been interesting and
valuable to have had the benefit of a decision of an international tribunal,
stating what are the principles of law applicable thereto.
International Law and the Expropriation
of the Asian Property
The Nature and Extent of the Takings,
and the Legal Limitations Thereon
The taking of the Asian property which was "abandoned" by its owners to the
Ugandan authorities, in accordance with Decree Nos. 27 and 29 of 1972, as
amended by Decree No. 5 of 1973, may be considered as a large-scale expropriation. The property was not nationalised; its possession was often transferred to
private persons, and there was no intention that it should be subjected to the
long run use and exploitation of the state. Much of the property has found its
way into private hands, including, it seems, those of certain of the staff of
Makerere University, who have benefited by obtaining Asian motor-cars. 160 The
Foreign Office have treated the taking of the Asian property as a large scale
16 1
expropriation, and they appear to be correct in their characterisation.
It may be that the property and the control of agents with limited powers can
be considered as effectively expropriated, given the limited powers of the agents
according to section 1(4) and 1(6) of Decree No. 29 of 1972, and also given their
inability to transfer any of the rents and profits accruing to the property to its

117he writers have been so informed by Dr. James Read, Reader in Law at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London.
"'See the statement of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Relations, to the effect that the expropriations, so far as they have occurred, are
discriminatory. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, December
15th-22nd, 1972, at columns 1126-7.
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owners.162 When the properties are sold, the sales would appear to be forced
163
sales, and hence as expropriations for which compensation must be paid.
It may be doubted whether the actual blocking of accounts would be
considered in itself as an expropriation of property. It was suggested by the
editors of the Netherlands InternationalLaw Review, that the refusal on the
part of Indonesia to grant permission for the transfer of funds abroad to the
owners of the Dutch enterprises taken over in Indonesia in effect deprived the
Dutch owners of all enjoyment of their property.' 6 4 Wortley has also argued that
6
exchange control regulation can amount to an expropriation of property. 1 It
has, however, often been decided that the refusal to permit the transfer of funds
abroad does not amount to an expropriation. 66 When, however, such measures
are considered in conjunction with measures of expropriation, perhaps they may
1 67
be so regarded.
Whilst it is generally agreed that states may nationalise or expropriate foreign
property, they do not enjoy an absolutely free discretion in this respect. The
limitations which have generally been said to apply to expropriation of foreign
property, are that the property must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
expropriating state; the expropriations must fulfil some public purpose; they
must not be discriminatory, and prompt, adequate and effective compensation
must be paid in respect to them. The taking of foreign property must be made
subject to the provisions of national constitutions or municipal laws. The effect
of such legal provisions is not clear.
" 2See Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property, B.Y.I.L. 1962, page 307, at pages 314-6.
The operation of the Uganda system of exchange control may be discriminatory and hence
probably contrary to international law. No decrees or statutory instruments are available which
detail the exact working of the exchange control regulation. Their operation is dependent on
instructions given by the President of the Bank of Uganda. We are indebted to Dr. Yash Tandon of
the L.S.E. and to Mr. Peggie of National Grindlay's Bank, for the information they have given us as
to their working. It seems that the accounts of both citizens and non-citizen Asians are blocked,
while U.K. citizens resident in Uganda are allowed to make monthly remittances outside Uganda,
and to take money with them when departing. Citizens of Arab countries resident in Uganda are
also entitled to withdraw money from Ugandan accounts, as also are Kenyan and Tanzanian
Africans. The accounts of Kenyan and Tanzanian Asians are blocked. Where exchange control
measures discriminate on the ground of race, they are contrary to international law, according to
Dr. F.A. Mann, the LegalAspects of Money, 3rd edition, page 500. The Ugandan authorities may
argue that their exchange control measures are not discriminatory on the ground of race, but on
other economic grounds. It appears that one of the reasons for the blocking of the Asian accounts
may be Uganda's inability to provide convertible currency for the expelled Asians. This inability
proceeds from her own wrong in expelling them, and it seems doubtful whether Uganda can adduce
her own wrong in order to help to rebut the presumption which may exist that the measures are
discriminatory. Note the decision of the Rumanian-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal in the Michel Macri
Case, 7 T.A.M. page 981. The Tribunal stated that a party cannot invoke in his own defence, a fact
for which he is responsible.
" 3Christie, op. cit., supra, pages 324-9.
"'SNETERLADS INTERNATIONAL LAw REVIEW (1958), pages 227, 242.
. 6 See his work, THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY, at pages 108-9.
"'See Christie, op. cit., supra, at page 318, fn. 4, for the relevant cases.
16French v. Banco National de Cuba, 23 N.Y. 2nd 46 (1868).
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It does not seem that General Amin has purported to expropriate any
property which is not amenable to the Ugandan jurisdiction. Although the
requirement is a vague one, it does not seem certain that the Ugandan expropriating decrees satisfy entirely the requirement of a public purpose. They are
discriminatory and possibly in breach of estoppels. The legality of the Ugandan
expropriations is discussed below.
The Requirement of a Public Purpose
Certain judicial decisions in the interWar period suggest that foreign
property may only be expropriated when the expropriating state acts from
motives of public utility. 6 The requirement of a public purpose for nationalisations and expropriations has been doubted by some in recent years.' 69 As is
pointed out by Martin Domke,'7 0 States have a considerable discretionary power
in determining what are their interests, and so, if the limitation exists, it is not a
difficult one to satisfy. The requirement is retained by Garcia Amador in his
FinalDraft on State Responsibility, which was prepared for the International
Law Commission. 71
' The Harvard Draft on State Responsibilityfor Injuries to
the Economic Interests of Aliens also retains the requirement.' 7
Schwarzenberger regards the requirement as still valid.' 7 3 Whatever value the
concept ma; have, its retention would seem perhaps specially justified in the
case of expropriations. It is interesting to note that both the Ugandan Constitution of 1962 and of 1967 required that the taking of property should be for
the public benefit, and that the necessity therefor should justify the causing of
any hardship which might result to any person having any interest in, or right
over the property.

74

Although it is thought that expropriations must be for a public purpose, the
vagueness of the concept makes the question as to whether an expropriation is
in the public interest largely a matter for the expropriating state. However, the
expropriating state must act in good faith and its determination of the public
interest must not be beyond reasonable limits.
When General Amin retroactively invalidated certain sales transactions
entered into by Asians,' 75 and later vested certain properties in the Abandoned
6

'See especially the award in the David Goldenberg Case between Germany and Rumania, 2
U.N.R.I.A.A., 901.

"'See AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, pub. 1967, at page 137,
and GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY, Chapter 7, pages 145-50.
1"0 Domke, Foreign Nationalisations,54 A.JI.L., page 588 at page 590.
"'I.L.C. Yearbook, 1961, (ii), 47; article 9 (2).
"'Article 10; see A.J.I.L. 1961, at page 553.
"'FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

pub. 1969, at pages 118 and 161.

'Constitution of 1962, article 22(1)(a) and (b); Constitution of 1967, article 13(1)(a) and (b). The
question as to whether article 13 of the 1967 Constitution creates any estoppels is considered at a
later stage.
'"Certain transfers and mortgages of property were retroactively made illegal by section 1 of

Decree No. 27. It is not clear whether the title to property passed despite this illegality. A Ugandan
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Property Custodian Board17 and thereafter in the government, 77 he did not
apparently attempt a closely reasoned justification of his actions. 78 However,
his reasons are implicit from certain of his statements. In a statement reported,
in the Uganda Argus on August 12th 1972,179 he stated that business in the
whole of Kampala, and all towns in Uganda, should be managed and controlled
by Africans. In a statement reported in the same newspaper on August 28th
1972,180 he said that the armed forces had a duty to put the economy of Uganda
into the hands of Ugandans. Black Ugandans should be enabled to buy all
shops, factories and gins.
Both the expropriations of non-citizen Asian property, and the appointments
of agents having limited powers for the sale of such property, appear to have
been in furtherance of the above objectives. Both operations were intended to
provide for the gradual transfer of businesses and properties to Ugandan
Africans, who often lacked enough capital to make purchases. When persons
acted in such a way that the latter policy might be frustrated insofar as no
information or documents were provided in respect of properties or businesses,
it was arguably in the public interest that such properties or businesses should
be vested in the Abandoned Property Custodian Board, and ultimately in the
government. Similarly, where properties were abandoned by the departed
Asians, it was also arguably in the public interest that such properties might be
vested in the board, such that it could carry out its function of disposal.,'
court would obviously hold that it did not. Where money was paid for such property by other
non-citizen Asians or aliens, it would seem that an international claim might be brought on their
behalf, and that the transferor would also have a claim in respect of his property. No international
claim could be brought in respect of moneys paid by aliens where it was clear that they had obtained
payment for the same, and had managed to withdraw their money from Uganda.
Certain sales were not only made retroactively illegal, but the property sold was vested in the
government. This situation arose when properties were sold, but no information or documents were
supplied to the minister: see section 4(5) of Decree No. 27. It is clear that although the decree was
retroactive, persons who sold property before it came into effect knew of the likely consequences: see
The Times, August 31st, 1972, page 2, cols. 1-5. They also knew of the possibility of retroactive
punishment. It is doubtful whether retroactive legislation is contrary to public international law.
Kelsen took the view that it was not: see KELSEN AND TUCKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw, 2nd ed., at p. 46; the matter seems uncertain. If it is, then perhaps those who had their
Property rights taken retroactively are theoretically entitled to lucram cessans. On the question of
retroactive legislation, see N. Marsh's essay The Supra-National Concepts of the Rule of Law,
OxFoRD ESSAYS ISNJURISPRUDENCE, edited by A.G. Guest, page 223, at pages 284-51.
"'Decree No. 29 of 1972, section 12(1) and 12(2).
"'Decree No. 5 of 1973, section 1(1).
"'We do not find anything. corresponding to the consideration which accompanied the
Indonesian nationalisation measures affecting Dutch property, which stated that the measures of
nationalisation took place because of Holland's refusal to negotiate on the question of Western
Irian. WHITEMAN'S DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 8, page 1048.
"'At page 1, Cols. 7-8.
"'At page 1, Column 4.
"'In early October 1972, General Amin, speaking of the abandoned properties, stated that
Ugandans had every right to own all these things because they were Ugandans, and everything in the
country belonged to them: see Uganda Argus, October 5th, 1972, page 1, cols. 5-8. Although
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The Ugandan authorities may be criticised, as has already been pointed out,
for not always following the procedures laid down in the decrees mentioned. it is
also noteworthy that General Amin never specifically justified the vesting of
houses and personal chattels that were abandoned in the Abandoned Property
Custodian Board and in the government. It might be contended that there was
no compelling urgency for this. 82 However, Uganda might contend, if called on
to justify her action, that the new entrepreneurial class which it was hoped
would emerge, would require somewhere to live, and that the economic
development of Uganda would be assisted by measures which would assist the
emergence of a petit bourgeoisie.
It would, it seems, be difficult for the U.K., or any other national state of the
expelled aliens, to adduce evidence that the expropriations were in bad faith.
The latter cannot be presumed of a state, and it would be difficult to adduce
sufficient evidence of the motives of the Ugandan authorities to show that they
acted in bad faith, or were predominantly motivated by it. Although General
Amin made statements such as that to the effect that taxpayers had been milked
white by Asians for almost a century"8 3 which might indicate animosity and bias,
it may be admitted that there is some element of truth in these statements, as
well as of exaggeration, and there seem, as has been suggested, plausible
grounds on which General Amin could have concluded that the expropriations
were in the public interest.
It might be argued that the Ugandan expropriations were not in the public
interest as the properties were not equally distributed to all sections of the
community. Specific groups were favoured, such as Baganda businessmen and
Muslim soldiers. The favoritism shown might help to establish that General
Amin was not predominantly motivated by a desire to further the well-being of
Uganda in taking the properties in question.
However, the distribution of properties to certain elite groups of great
importance to the economic and political life of the nation does not necessarily
negate the presence of such a desire. It might also be argued that, given the lack
of economic expertise of certain Ugandans, the redistribution might be to the
public detriment rather than benefit. On the other hand, it may be for the
benefit of a country if its economy is removed from foreign domination.
General Amin's statement represents an incorrect statement of the law, it may be deduced from it
that he believed that the transfer of properties belonging to the non-citizen Asians, to the Ugandans,
would benefit Uganda.
" 2Some international lawyers have argued that such a compelling need must exist before
properties can be taken to satisfy public need. Thus the International L4W Association, in its 48th
Conference in 1958, stated that an expropriating state must show that a taking of property is
necessitated by a dominating public purpose: see Resolution on Nationalisation, 48th Conference,
New York, Sept. lst-12th, 1958, page XV. It is not clear from the statements when, how, and in what
detail the presence of such a purpose must be shown. It would seem to be sufficient if it is shown in
diplomatic correspondence, or before an international tribunal.
"'See Kessing's ContemporaryArchives, Dec. 2nd-9th, 1972, columns 25598.
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Thus the Ugandan expropriations do not seem to have lacked a public
purpose, although whether there was a compelling need for certain of them may
be doubted.
It has already been suggested that it is possible to regard properties placed in
the hands of agents with limited powers as already expropriated, given the
provisions of section 1(4)-1(6) of Decree No. 27 of 1972, which drastically limit
the powers of the agents and the fact that rents and profits may not be
transferred outside Uganda. If they be so considered, these takings may be
created as being for the benefit of Uganda, forming as they do an integral part
of a programme of Africanisation.
It may be maintained, however, that there was no economic necessity to
impose restrictions on disposition of all departed property-owners; such
restrictions on disposition should, it might be contended, only be imposed on
dispositions of properties of considerable economic importance and value.
Further, it would be possible for Uganda to contend that the restrictions on
disposition exist to ensure that no property transactions take place which are
not in the interest of Uganda, of which she is the paramount judge. Given the
elasticity of the concept of the "public interest," it would be difficult to show
that certain of the Ugandan expropriations did not conform to the requirement.
The DiscriminatoryNature of the
Ugandan Expropriations
The Ugandan expropriations appear to have been of a clearly discriminatory
character, and as such contrary to international law. No property belonging to
citizens has been taken by the three relevant decrees, which were exclusively
concerned with properties belonging to non-citizens. There does not appear to
be any principle of international customary law which would make it possible to
4
justify them on the grounds of their political or economic motivation .
Contemporary international law appears to have retained its traditional
prohibition of discriminatory expropriation in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, both the District Court of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals
recognised the continued viability of the principle.18 5 Dimrock D.J., who
"'GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY, pub. 1961, at 144, states that
when an expropriation is discriminatory, there is no authority which permits a state to rely on the
political or economic motives underlying a measure in exoneration of its discriminatory effect.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1973 ed. at page 524, fn. 3, suggests that
such expropriations may be justified on the basis of economic or social grounds. Brownlie, however,
cites authorities in support of his proposition which relate to situations in which only foreign
nationals own the property in question. Even if Brownlie is correct, it may be doubtful whether there
are compelling economic and social needs for all the expropriations carried out in Uganda.
"'For reports of these decisions, see U.S. District Court, S.D. New York 60, Civ. 3929, March
31st, 1961, and 56 A J.I.L. (1962). The latter decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on another
point, see 4 I.L.M. 381, for a critique of the judgment of the Supreme Court, See R. Falk, The
Complexity of Sabbatino, AJ.I.L., 1964, at page 935.
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delivered the judgment of the U.S. District Court of New York, stated that,
when an expropriation is prima facie discriminatory it may be possible to justify
it on the grounds of the security of the state, or the conduct of the owners of the
property. The justifications in question were recognized by traditional
customary international law.' 81 6
Some would argue that all discriminatory expropriations are not contrary to
international law. The Court of Appeals of Bremen, in the Indonesian
Tobacco'87 case, in which the recognition of discriminatory acts of nationalisation of Dutch property was in question, stated that the unequal treatment of
unequals was permissible, and stressed the dominant role of Dutch companies
in the production and distribution of Indonesian goods.'
It is doubtful whether the principle of the Indonesian Tobacco case is good
law: it would be capable of working considerable injustice to ex-colonial powers.
If it is good law, then it may be applicable to the expropriation of businesses
belonging to nationals of a former colonial power who exercise a dominant role
in the economy of a newly emergent state, and may permit discrimination
between them and nationals, and between them and other classes of aliens.
It cannot apply to the taking of all the abandoned property of nationals of the
colonial power, including personal chattels, and businesses of little economic
importance. It also does not appear applicable to the expropriation of property
belonging to persons of other than British nationality and of stateless persons,
unless the latter be regarded as sufficiently identified with the colonial
exploiters to come within the ambit of the principle.
It is doubtful whether the principle of the Indonesian Tobacco case is good
law, and if it is, whether the Ugandan expropriating decrees may be assumed to
come within its purview.
Some have argued that discriminatory expropriations do not confer a title
which can be recognized by foreign courts,"8 9 and that in the case of such
expropriations, specific restriction may be demanded. 190 Specific restriction is
evidently not likely to happen in the present case, and it is doubtful whether the
British government would demand it, although it made a claim for specific
restriction in its Memorial in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case. 91
As discriminatory expropriations are contrary to international law, the
"'See the discussion in WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, pages
40-57.
"'N. V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschapijen and N.V. Senembah Maaschapij V Deutsche
Indonenische Tabak HandelsgesellschaftM.b.H., cited M. Domke, AJ.I.L. 1960, page 315.
"'See the comments of M. Domke on his case in his article, Foreign Nationalisations, AJ.I.L.
1961, at pages 585 and 601.
1"The matter is very controversial. See the article by M. Domke, Indonesian Nationalisation
MeasuresBefore ForeignCourts, 54 A.J.I.L. 305 (1960), and the reply to this article by Baade, ibid.,
at page 801. British and American courts might refuse to recognise such a title.
" See the article cited by Baade, who denies that this is the case.
"'I.CJ.P., 1953, at page 18.
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Ugandan government may, according to a strict construction of the principles of
international law applicable, be liable to pay indirect damages as well as the full
market value of the property taken.192 Although many of the post-war
nationalisations have had discriminatory features, it seems that not many claims
for indirect damages in respect of them have been made in recent years.1 93 It
may be that the rule of customary international law requiring indirect damages
has undergone some modification, at least in the area of the nationalisation of
foreign property, and possibly also in that of expropriation.
The Possible Relevance of the
Foreign Investments (Protection)Act of 1964 and
of the Ugandan Constitution of 1967
The Foreign Investment (Protection) Act 1964 is applicable to investments
made in Uganda with funds that have originated abroad, which includes the
Commonwealth . 9 4 It seems that this act has not been repealed. Section 2 of the
act provides that no enterprise, interest in, or right over, any property or
undertaking forming part of the enterprise, shall be compulsorily acquired or
taken possession of save in accordance with the provisions of section 22 of the
Constitution. 9 5 Compensation must be paid within six months, and a person
who is dissatisfied with a compulsory acquisition or taking of possession, or the
amount of compensation payable thereon, may appeal to the High Court for the
determination of his right or interest, the legality of the taking, or the amount of
compensation due.
It is possible to consider the act in question as one which merely has
application in the domestic sphere, although it relates to aliens. It might be
thought, however, that the relevant provision could be considered as creative of
an estoppel, 9 6 in favour of investors who take on the faith of its provisions, to
the effect that during the period in which the statute is not amended or
repealed, or remains in force in Uganda, property will not be expropriated
"'For the relevant authorities, see BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd
ed., page 524, fn. 5.
19'The British government made such a claim in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case. See the British
Memorial, I.CJ.P. 1955, at pages 109-10, and GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALISATION AND
EXPROPRIATION, page 211.
"lbid, section 5(2).
"'Now see section 13 of the 1967 Constitution.
"'For discussions of estoppel in public international law, see the Individual Opinions of Judges
Alfaro, Fitzmaurice and Spender in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J.
Reports at pages 39-51, 62-5 and 143-4, and the Majority Opinion of the International Court of
Justice in the Barcelona Traction Case (Preliminary Objection) 1964 I.CJ. Reports at page 6. See
also Bowett, Estoppel Before InternationalTribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence, B.Y.I.L.
1957 at page 176, J.C. Macgibbons, Estoppel in InternationalLaw,I.C.L.Q. 1958 at page 509, and
the paper on estoppel by Domince in Etudes Dans I'honneur de Paul Guggenheim, pub. Genive,
1968. Estoppel is often thought to be a shield and not a sword in public international law; see the
judgement of Sir Percy Spender in the Temple case.
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except in accordance with its provisions. 1"7
It is not thought that Uganda could be held to represent, in passing the
statute that it would never be amended, repealed or fall into desuetude as a
result of internal revolution. Any inference of a restriction on the right of a state
to legislate internally requires positive establishment. 98
Decree No. 27 of 1972, as amended by Decree No. 29 of 1972, section 16, does
not provide for the payment of prompt and adequate compensation within six
months, which compensation has not been paid, nor does this section appear to
make it possible to refer the legality of the takings to the High Court.1 99 It may
be that the decree impliedly repeals or amends the Foreign Investments
(Protection) Act to the extent to which they are incompatible, 00 and that it is
not possible for the relevant investors to claim that the Act of 1964 effects an
estoppel. It also appears that since the revolution, the act may have fallen into
disuse.
It is doubtful whether article 22 of the Constitution of 1962, or article 13 of
the Constitution of 1967 can be regarded as effecting any estoppel on behalf of
expellees who bought or retained property in Uganda when the constitutional
provisions were in force.201 Such constitutional provisions may be thought to
have primarily internal effect and not to be creative of international obligations.
Given that they are so creative, it would be very difficult to show that a
particular alien had acquired or retained property in Uganda on the faith of a
constitutional provision of which he might very well have been ignorant.
It would also be difficult to show that aliens who were cognisant of the
constitutional provisions, had not bought or retained property not primarily
because of them, but because of their own expectations as to the political and
economic future of Uganda or because of the difficulty in finding a purchaser.
"'See NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING STATES,
page 63, for the contention that such a statute might create an estoppel.
"'See the Lotus Case, D.C.I.J. Series A, No. 10. The writers are indebted to Professor D.H.N.
Johnson of the L.S.E., Dr. Michael Akehurst, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Keele, Dr.
Geoffrey Marston, Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and Mr. Steven Katz, Lecturer in
Law at the University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology for their assistance in
elucidating some questions relating to estoppel. The opinions expressed are those of the present
writers.
"'The formula of words used is that any person aggrieved by the decision of the values may refer
the matter to a tribunal (which has not yet been constituted), and then to the High Court. Appeals
are only, it seems, to be allowed against the valuation of the property.
10011seems that section 2(b)(1) of the Judicature Act, 1962, provides that the doctrine of implied
repeal is part of the law of Uganda. This section provides, somewhat ambiguously, that the
principles of English common law which were in force before August 11th, 1902 are part of the law
of Uganda, so far as circumstances permit and with suitable qualifications to local circumstances.
The doctrine of implied repeal was known to English law before 1902; see Garnett v. Bradley, (1878)
3 App Cases 944. The fact that the doctrine is known in Uganda is also implicit from the
Interpretation Act, 1963, section 16.
""Article 13 applies, like article 22, to all expropriations of property in Uganda, whether or not
the property was bought with funds originating from abroad.
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Even if these difficulties could be surmounted, it is thought that Uganda could
not be held to represent that she would never alter or amend her constitution, or
20 2
that it would never fall into desuetude.
It does not seem, therefore, that either the provisions of the Act of 1964, or of
either Constitution, could be held to effect an estoppel on behalf of the states of
the expellees. These states must look to the existing provisions of general international law, regarding the expropriation of the property of aliens, in making
claims on behalf of their nationals, and not to the specific provisions of
Ugandan law mentioned.
The Duty to Pay Compensation
Both the existence of the duty to pay compensation when foreign property is
nationalised or expropriated, and the quantum of compensation to be paid in
the event of such nationalisation or expropriation, have been the subject of
controversy in recent years. The provisions of national legislation have often
recognised the existence of a duty to pay in recent years, 03 as have also many
composition agreements entered into between states in post-Second World War
20 4
years.
The General Assembly's well-known resolution, Permanent Sovereignty over
National Resources, which constitutes evidence of international customary law,
states that in the case of nationalisation, expropriation or requisition, the owner
shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in force in
the state taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty, and in
205
accordance with international law.
Investor states have usually argued in favour of adequate compensation when
the property of their nationals has been expropriated. It is not clear what is
meant by adequate compensation, although a definition has been attempted in
the Harvard Draft on the Responsibility of State for Injuries to Aliens. 206
International lawyers have often questioned the principles of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation in the case of nationalisation measures, and it may
be that some of the considerations that have motivated this questioning are also
operative in the case of the Ugandan expropriations of non-citizen Asian
2 2
1t may be that the 1967 Constitution has already fallen in desuetude. The matter receives
further discussion when the question of local remedies is considered.
2 3
See NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, pages 59 et seq.
0
' 'AMERASINGHE, op. cit., supra, at page 146.
20 5
1 he decision of the Bremen Court of Appeals already referred to, denied the duty to
compensate in the case of natonalisations of a general character with the purpose of changing the
social structure of a colony; see 56 AJ.I.L., 1962, at page 316.
"°6See AJ.I.L. 1961 at page 553 (article 10). Adequate compensation is there defined as the
compensation which would be granted to the nationals of the State taking the property, or the fair
market value of the property, or in the absence of such a fair market value, just compensation in
terms of the value of the property.
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property, although they have many objectionable features.2 °7
It may be that a new rule of customary international law is in process of
formation, according to which less than full, but substantial, compensation
must be paid in the event of the nationalisation of foreign property. The reasons
for such a rule may be the need of many emergent countries to develop, the
limitation of their economic resources, and perhaps the profit made by foreign
investors, and the indirect harm done to the economy by their activities.
It is clear that Uganda requires to develop her own industrial and commercial
activities and has limited resources. It is also true that Asians have made
considerable profits in that country, sometimes by means of exploitation, and
often have remitted them abroad to the detriment of the economy.20 8 It may be
that these considerations militate in favour of the payment of less than full
compensation, even though the expropriations were discriminatory.
It seems that the U.K. would probably in any negotiations with Uganda,
initially adopt the position that, especially in view of certain of the
circumstances of the expropriations, international law requires the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 0 9 It is thought that any
compromise which might be reached, whether or not it is considered to be
based on existing principles of international customary law, would necessarily
be on the basis of something less than full and adequate compensation.
The British government has adopted the view that payment should be made
in convertible currency.21 0 The attitude adopted by it seems justified;
compensation in the form of Ugandan bonds would not be satisfactory, as the
income from them could not be transferred abroad freely.2 ' Payment should, it
is thought, be made over a reasonable period of time, and the Ugandan
government could not plead its undoubted economic difficulties in securing an
undue delay. The British government has already conceded, in its Memorial in
the Anglo-Iranian Oil case, that delayed payment of compensation is
'°Lauterpacht stated that full compensation was not always necessary, and that the obligation to
pay full compensation might make a projected reform impossible: see Hague Recueil, 1937, volume
4 at p. 346. See also the statements relating to inexpropriation of the additional requirements of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation in cases in which developing countries expropriate
property, which were made by Senor Padilla Nervo of Mexico, and Mr. Pal of India to the
International Law Commission in 1957: Yearbook of the I.L.C., 1957, Volume 1 at pages 155 and
Note also the decision of the Civil Court of Rome in Anglo-Iranian Co. Ltd. v. U.P.O.R. (1955)
INT. L. R. 22, in which it was stated that, provided some compensation was paid, the expropriation
in question (arguably a discriminatory one) was not contrary to international law.
' 0sSee General Amin's telegram to President Nixon, reported in Voice of Uganda, April 5th, 1973,
at page 1.
' 0 91t is unlikely that a claim for indirect damages would be made, even though the takings seem to
be contrary to international law. It is still less likely that a claim for specific restitution of certain
Asian properties would be made by the U.K. although such claims may be legally justified.
" See the statement referred to by Sir Alec Douglas-Home in the House of Commons on
December 14th, 1972.
2
"See AMERASINGHE, op. cit. at page 162 for the suggestion that payment of compensation may
sonietimes be made in bonds.
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admissible under certain conditions, namely, that satisfactory guarantees that
future payments will be made, must be given.21 The British position may
represent the present rule of customary international law.
It is not thought that Uganda could refuse to meet her obligation to pay
compensation within a reasonable period of time, and in a convertible currency,
by pleading her inability to obtain the necessary foreign exchange. It would
appear that, should she show herself willing to meet her international
obligations, funds could be made available to her from creditor countries and
from international financial agencies. 13
It is unlikely that the question of the expropriation of non-citizen property
will be referred to the International Court of Justice. It would, it is thought, be
possible for the parties to waive compliance with the local remedies rule, and
refer a dispute concerning the payment of compensation to the International
Court of Justice by special agreement if they were willing." ' It is doubtful
whether adequate local remedies exist in Uganda and there are, of course,
political difficulties in the way of courts inhibiting them" from granting such
remedies as may exist.
Until valuers are appointed by the Ugandan government, the tribunal
provided for by section 16(3) of Decree No. 29 of 1962 cannot enter upon its
functions, and neither can the High Court. An action of mandamus might
theoretically be brought on behalf, of the expellees against the members of the
Abandoned Property Custodian Board, to compel the appointment of valuers,
but such an action is unlikely in the extreme to receive a hearing under present
political circumstances.
It seems, as has been suggested to be implicit from the wording of this section,
that expellees may not challenge the validity of the expropriating decrees before
the board, but merely the quantum of compensation. It would, however,
perhaps be theoretically possible to argue before the tribunal that, as the
expropriations were not in accordance with international law, the Ugandan
government must pay indirect damages in respect of them.
The remedy provided for those who have bought certain categories of
property with funds originating from abroad, by section 2(3) of the 1964 Foreign
Investments (Protection) Act, may well be in desuetude or the act may be treated
as amended by Decree No. 29, article 16 of 1972. It might be possible, given a
different political climate in Uganda, for representatives of expellees to ask the
12

' See I.C.J.P. 1951 at page 106, and for treaty practice in the area of nationalisation, FOIGHEL,
1957 pages 127 et seq.
Note the Russian Indemnity Case, Scott 1 H.C.R. page 532 at page 546. See also Cheng, the
Rationale of Compensationfor Expropriation, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 1958-9, page
267, at page 308. Note especially the cases mentioned at footnote 131.
21
"The
local remedies' rule is generally thought to be of a procedural character. See
AMERASINGHE op. cit., supra, Chapter VI, and the authorities referred to.
NATIONALISATION,
213
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High Court to grant an appropriate remedy for the non-observance of article 13
of the 1961 Constitution, which article relates to the expropriation of
property.215 In the present political climate, the chances of the High Court
hearing a case brought on behalf of an expellee, and based on the
non-observance of section appear minimal. 2" 6
Failure to grant legal representation to such expellees may amount to a denial
of justice.217 Thus, Uganda has successfully carried into effect a programme of
racially discriminatory expropriations without compensation being paid in
respect of them, although some compensation has been promised in the future.
The likelihood of the obtention of municipal or international remedies in
respect of the expropriations in the immediate future appears extremely small.
Conclusion
The Ugandan expulsions have served to demonstrate some of the weaknesses
of contemporary international law, and the uncertainty which exists as to the
precise content of its norms in the areas of human rights and the expropriation
of foreign property. Although the U.K. accepted her undoubted international
obligation to her expelled nationals and citizens, there may be political
difficulties in the way of her doing so again in the event of future mass
expulsions.
It is to be hoped that the U.K. will not take refuge in a doubtful application of
the "link" theory if faced with a similar problem in the future. It is thought
doubtful whether she would do so. It would also be difficult for the U.K., a
signatory of the New York Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, to deprive
her citizens of their nationality, in order to prevent their entry if expelled.
Although the precise content of the present norms of international law
relating to the collective expulsion of aliens is not simple to determine, it is
5

"' 1n the case of the non-observance of the human rights provisions of the Constitution of 1967, it
is possible to apply to the High Court for an appropriate remedy in accordance with section 20(1) of
the Constitution. It is thus theoretically possible for representatives of expellees to claim a
declaration that the expropriating decrees be read subject to article 13 of the Constitution, such that
individuals may be able to claim prompt and adequate compensation, or to contest the validity of
the expropriations in the courts.
It may be doubted whether the Constitutional provision in question is still in force. General
Amin has purported to suspend certain provisions of the Constitution of 1967, and he has assumed
wide powers as a result of the Constitution (Amendment) Order, Decree No. 5 of 1971. Political
activities have been banned by Decree No. 14 of 1971, which is expressly stated to take effect
notwithstanding the civil rights provisions of articles 10 and 17-19 of the 1967 Constitution. It seems
probable" that, if Ugandan judges were confronted with the issue, they would decide either that
article 13 is in suspense, or that, owing to the lack of effectiveness of the 1967 Constitution, none of
its provisions retain any validity. The present position can be distinguished from that which
obtained in Uganda v. Prison Commissioner ex. parte Matovu (1966) E.A. 514, as in that case, a new
Constitution had been promulgated.
"'No cases of constitutional importance have been dealt with by the Ugandan Courts within the
last two years.
21
'See X v. Government of Sweden, (1959), European Yearbook of Human Rights at page 354.
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thought that, at least in the case of apparently racially discriminatory
expulsions, the onus is on the expelling state to show the presence of
compelling non-racial grounds for the expulsion. There have been many
collective expulsions since 1945, and the level of activity of the international
community and of the political organs of the United Nations, has perhaps been
disappointing." 8
The Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations will turn its attention to the protection of non-citizens in the
near future, 29 and hence to the questions of the individual and collective
expulsions of aliens. It would be desirable if the law in respect to this latter
matter could be clarified. It is noteworthy that recently President Kenyatta has
stated that the rights of the minority in East African states should be reconciled
with the legitimate interests of the African majority, and that independence is
meaningless without guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms .220
A multilateral treaty concerned with the protection of aliens might be
formulated, according to the provisions of which discriminatory collective
expulsions were made clearly illegal, whether the discrimination was on the
grounds of race, language, religion, nationality or national origins. Other
collective expulsions should be permitted only where there are serious grounds
other than those just mentioned. Some would argue that collective expulsions
should not be permitted at all in peacetime."2
No expulsion should be permitted without a serious inquiry taking place. 2
Special considerations should be given to the protection of aliens who have long
been residents in a given country. It should be made clear that the collective
expulsion of aliens is not permissible except as a reprisal. The determination of
the existence of serious grounds of expulsion should be within the jurisdiction of
an international tribunal. This tribunal should perhaps be given jurisdiction in
both the case of individual and collective expulsions. Any state party to the
proposed treaty should be able to ask the tribunal to interpret and apply it and
to refer its alleged breach by any party to the tribunal.
It may be, however, that any multilateral treaty on a universal basis which
21
Thus, in December 1969, several thousand Nigerians were expelled by the Busia regime in
Ghana. More recently, Ghanaian immigrants have been expelled from Sierra Leone and Liberia and
Iranians from Iraq. None of these expulsions have resulted in any decisive United Nations action.
21
'The Commission on Human Rights has recently adopted a British resolution requiring the
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities to consider
the legal protection of non-citizens: see U.N. Document E/CN4/L: 1240 Rev./1.
22
The Times, 2nd June, 1973 page 6, col. 5.
"'Customary International law is used to permit collective expulsions in wartime. Thus, in 1870,
there was a collective expulsion of Germans from France and, in 1898 and 1911, an expulsion of
Greeks and Italians from the Ottoman Empire. For the examples cited, see LUBENHOFF, DsE
VbLYERRECHrLICHE LAGE AUF DEM BALKAN. ZfaovR, 1934, at page 127. The modern practice
appears to be to intern enemy aliens in wartime, and cogent reasons would be required for departure
from this practice.
12Aliens
should always have a right of apeal to judicial or administrative bodies.
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attempted to define and restrict the power of states to expel aliens would obtain
few signatures, and would encounter many reservations. The experience with
the United Nations covenants on human rights has not been encouraging.
Perhaps conventions on a regional basis are more likely to obtain success than
those on a universal basis in this area. Some advanced states may consider the
question of the expulsion of aliens to be within their domestic jurisdiction whilst
many emergent states have minorities which they may consider to be
troublesome, difficult to integrate, possessed of too much economic power or of
foreign loyalties. Certain of these states may sometimes contemplate the
expulsion of such minorities and they may thus be unwilling to fetter what they
may consider their existing freedom by entering into conventional obligations.
The analysis attempted of the Ugandan expropriations may serve to
demonstrate the conflict of interests and doctrine which exists on many
questions relating to the expropriation and nationalisation of foreign property
in contemporary international law. As has been suggested, it is extremely
unlikely that Uganda will pay full or prompt compensation, whatever may be
the applicable rules of international customary law in the circumstances, and
however unsatisfactorily she may have behaved. The Ugandan expropriations
demonstrate the limited value of investment-guarantee laws, and of
constitutional provisions which provide for prompt and adequate compensation.
It may be that the international community can bring some pressure on
Uganda to pay compensation if states refrain from granting loans to her, and
international financial institutions likewise refrain, until the question is
satisfactorily settled. Expulsion from the Commonwealth would be more likely
to exacerbate extreme nationalistic or racial feelings than to achieve any positive
22 3
result.

223

Note the questions to Lady Tweedsmuir, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office by Lords Barnby, Avebury Gladwyn and Slater on March 20th, 1973, concerning the
possibility of expelling Uganda from the Commonwealth, and from the United Nations:
Parliamentary Debates, H.L., Weekly Hansard, Issue No. 862, 19th-22nd March, cols. 591-4.
Uganda could be expelled from the United Nations according to article 6 of the Charter, as she has
not fulfilled her obligations in good faith, but it is doubtful whether this would do any positive good.
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